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Sub-Saharan Africa Report



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10 January 1986

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UNIDO OFFICIAL ON CONTINENT'S PRECARIOUS SITUATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 6-7 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Jean Schwoebel: "Black Africa in Peril"]

[Text] The 1980's were proclaimed to be the "Decade of African Industrial Development" by the assembly of UNIDO, an organization charged by the United Nations in 1965 with aiding the governments of Third World countries in developing their industrial production.

They calculated that they would have to devote \$140 billion to that objective. Now UNIDO has a budget of only \$209 million. Such figures can do without commentary. Should we be surprised that, despite many other efforts, those of the World Bank in particular, far from advancing, African industrial production is on the downgrade.

And today more than ever, Africa is incapable of guaranteeing its subsistence. With the highest birthrate in the world, its population is increasing at the rate of 3 percent a year. At this rate in 40 years, in the year 2025, it will have reached the figure of 1.5 billion inhabitants, or three times what it is today. Meanwhile, erosion, deforestation, desertification, etc. will get worse on the black continent and cases of famine and malnutrition will multiply.

It is hard to see how the decline of black Africa could from then on be stopped unless this population explosion is not very quickly curbed and unless the countries of this planet that are most well off finally decide to grant the African countries the broadest amount of voluntary aid without wanting to dictate their behavior or enlist them in their ideological and strategic conflicts. For it is up to the developing countries themselves to resolve all these problems with the resources placed at their disposal.

The stabilization programs a number of African countries have today implemented will not in any case extricate Africa from the situation. This is the opinion of most of the African experts attached to the international organizations. Revealing these countries' extreme dependence on foreign capital, these programs accord priority to the payment of their growing debt services to the detriment of the crying social needs of their populations. It is out of the question for them to be able to go very far in this way.

So, all these countries, those of the South as well as those of the North, are today being seriously challenged by the African problem. For all and sundry this constitutes a test of their ability to cooperate in order to put a stop to the pernicious evil that is devouring Africa before it soon reaches other continents. The responsibility of the industrialized countries is today particularly involved, starting with that of the two superpowers whose arms race is accelerating more and more to the detriment of development and the globe's material and human resources.

Incumbent on the news media is the indispensable, but extremely difficult and perilous job of exposing to the public, on the one hand, the global dimensions of the critical problems the extension of misery in most of the Third World countries pose to all of mankind and, on the other, the need for granting these countries more generous, more disinterested and less directive aid for development.

For the first time, they were recently able to reveal the horrors of famine in the world, particularly in Africa, and to mobilize public opinion in favor of massive emergency aid. While sometimes ambiguous and too often political, this antihunger campaign had the other merit of throwing a glaring light on the disastrous consequences of the inequalities among nations.

In this way pangs of conscience began to arise here and there, the necessary orientation for which was properly specified by Mrs Focke, the chairwoman of the European Parliament's Cooperation and Development Commission last April. At the conclusion of the proceedings of the European Communities' 11th ONG (Non-governmental Organizations) for Development Assembly, she in essence said that the public must understand that you have to have money [to combat] hunger, but that you have to have just as much to change the structures that are blocking development.

In the absence of a North-South dialogue on these structures which the governments have suspended, for 6 years now against all odds the supplement UN SEUL MONDE has been engaging in reflections, common to several newspapers and the organizations of the United Nations system, on the problems of development and international solidarity.

It is today high time to apply these reflections by extending them to movements and organizations like the ONG for Development and associations moved by a spirit of cooperation and reciprocity. Their traditions and their concerns, as well as their competence and their experience, in fact confer on the latter the ability and therefore the duty of effectively contributing to this in-depth reporting and this community aid which are so lacking today in international society.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FORMER OFFICIAL ON NEED TO INDUSTRIALIZE

Paris LE MONDE in French 6-7 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Abd el Rahman Khane, the ex-executive director general of UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization)]

[Text] The key question is still: why industrialize Africa, even if too few people still do not see either the necessity or the mutual advantages for the industrialized and the developing countries.

For us at UNIDO industrialization of the Third World in general is indispensable for several reasons.

We start out first on the basis of the principle that all human beings would like to see the standard of living of their fellow humans improved. Approximately 600 to 800 million human beings today live under conditions of extreme poverty. Over 70 million of them are on the African continent.

Next we feel that, given the present rate of population growth in many developing countries, industry is essential to respond to the fundamental needs of the population: food, clothing, housing, health and education.

Another argument: Raw materials are largely available in many developing countries. It is financial resources, management competence and know-how that are lacking.

In short, the developing countries want to become industrialized for the simple reason that they know that it is the best way for them to acquire a just place in world production. Indeed, trade terms favor manufactured products and services to the detriment of raw materials.

Aware of these needs, in 1975 the international community decided that the industrial production of the developing countries should go from 10 to 25 percent of world industrial production between now and the year 2000.

Today, almost 10 years later, the developing countries' share comes to only 11 percent. We must realize that the United States alone represents 20 percent of world industrial production. It is also easy to calculate that, even if the developing countries' industrial production represented 25 percent

of world industrial production between now and the year 2000, the gap between the affluent countries and the poor countries would continue to widen.

UNIDO is the UN organization charged with "aiding, favoring and accelerating the industrialization of the developing countries." To illustrate the assistance UNIDO furnishes them with, we may, for example, cite: the vertical integration of the Mongolian cashmere industry, for which the initiatives adopted by UNIDO have succeeded in making of Mongolia, which up until then was an exporter of virgin wool, a country that exports high quality clothes. It was in cooperation with a producer of Japanese cashmere that UNIDO was able to perfect the necessary specialized equipment and to train Mongolian workers in the use of that equipment.

In order to aid the most deprived of all, the least advanced countries, UNIDO has been actively employed in mobilizing resources to aid these countries to formulate programs and projects and to establish preinvestment studies. Of the 36 countries the United Nations considers to be the least advanced, 26 are African countries. The region's economic crisis is reflected in other distressing statistics: 34 African countries continuously suffer from drought, 24 are ranked among those countries with food shortages and 21 figure on the World Bank's list of low-income countries; the region's foreign debt was multiplied by five during the course of the last decade and came to \$77.5 billion in 1980; in some of these countries there are barely enough foreign exchange reserves to cover 2 months of imports.

A Serious Test

Because of their economic structure, that is, because their foreign exchange receipts are in large part dependent on one or two primary products, these countries are vulnerable, on the one hand, to climatic fluctuations and, on the other, to the prices that prevail on the world market for their primary products.

In Africa it is not of industrialization, but often of "deindustrialization" that we ought to speak.

The international community's concern for Africa's misery was, when we come down to it, reflected in the proclamation of the "Decade of African Industrial Development" for the period 1980-1990. Its quantitative objective is to see to it that Africa's share of world industrial production comes to at least 1.4 percent in 1990 instead of the 1 percent it represents at present. From the qualitative point of view, the objective of the decade is regional self-sufficiency in the domains of food, construction materials, clothing and energy.

This program of complete technical assistance -- implemented -- is going to put to a severe test the competences UNIDO has accumulated during the 18 years that have gone by since it was created as an autonomous organ of the UN General Assembly.

The case of Africa is also an occasion for the world to put itself to a serious test. Considering the gifts with which nature has endowed it, the region can become self-sufficient and its development autonomous. But Africa has need of aid from the international community, which in the final analysis means that it has need of the support of world opinion.

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SECURITY DOCTRINES OF CENTRAL AFRICA

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French Aug-Sep, Oct-Nov 85

[Two-part article by Joseph Owono (Introduction and Part II) and Antoine Zanga, University of Yaounde (Part I): "Security Doctrines in Central Africa"]

[Aug-Sep 85 pp 3-15]

[Text] Introduction

"Seeking protection against the risk of attack,¹ making sure that one will not be attacked or, in case of attack, that one will receive immediate and effective aid from other nations": This seems to be the essential concern of the seven countries of Central Africa: the United Republic of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gabon, the Congo, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe.²

This concern implies a determination to protect oneself from dangers that could imperil the peace, tranquillity, independence and territorial integrity of nations.³ It also implies a guarantee of the domestic and foreign security of the nations involved. Do the seven countries of Central Africa manifest such a concern?

Africa in general⁴ and Central Africa in particular are in the process of becoming a hub of interference and strategic stakes. Several reasons argue for an increase in the sensitivity of the region. The substantial mining resources necessary to the economics of Japan and the West (the United States, France, Belgium and Great Britain) are found in the region. Upper Shaba (Zaire), a veritable geological "gold mine," has copper and zinc, and other provinces of Zaire have strategic ores (cobalt, diamonds, and so on). Gabon produces manganese (third-ranking exporter in the world) and uranium, also produced in the Central African Republic. In Edea, Cameroon has a major aluminum foundry that processes alumina imported from Guinea. The JEUNE AFRIQUE Atlas reveals other types of production: gold, coal, iron, potassium, lead and tin.⁵ Central Africa has another undeniable asset: oil.⁶ Despite the discretion of the French-speaking authorities of Africa, the establishment of ELF-ERAP [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France-Petroleum Prospecting and Activities Enterprises] in the Congo, Cameroon and Gabon demonstrate this interest, which is shared by other industrialized countries searching for marginal supply

areas. The American multinational companies have therefore made their appearance in the hydrocarbon sector (Cameroon with Gulf Oil, the Oceanic Exploration Company, and so on).

Other resources of Central Africa may be of interest to the superpowers and influence its security: those from its forests. Central Africa produces a little over one-third of all African tropical wood. Gabon and Zaire are the biggest producers in the region (okoume, mahogany, iroko).

Decolonization itself made the security problems of Central Africa more complex. Colonial powers responsible for the territories of the nations of Central Africa, acting as allies, provided their security quite quietly. First of all, the boundaries inherited from the division of Africa in the past century cannot fail to rouse animosity and conflicts between neighbors,⁷ although one should note that such conflicts have been less acute in that part of the continent than elsewhere (Algeria-Morocco, Ethiopia-Somalia, Somalia-Kenya, Tanzania-Uganda). Nevertheless, these conflicts remain important parameters of any security policy. Gabon opposed Equatorial Guinea in seeking control of a few little islands near the two countries probably possessing oil. An agreement on the demarcation of the maritime borders of the two countries was concluded and an equal-representation joint commission set up. The friendly relations between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the United Republic of Cameroon are periodically troubled by border incidents despite the agreement of 1 September 1974 providing for a neutral zone straddling the line dividing the territorial waters of the two nations.⁸ The Aouzou strip remains occupied by the Libyan-Arab Jamahiriya.⁹ Second, decolonization led to the emergence of new international protagonists in the region in the East and West. Central Africa has long remained a zone of domination of European nations. Spain occupied Equatorial Guinea and the Island of Fernando Poo, while France administered Cameroon, along with Great Britain, and controlled the vast territory including Chad, the Congo, the Central African Republic, Belgium and the vast and rich Zaire. The former colonial powers have preserved their interests as best they could, led by France.¹⁰

The United States is among those busy new protagonists. The recent history of Zaire and Angola bears witness to its growing interest in the region.¹¹ The strategic motivations of this growing interest, surely perceived as a danger to the security of certain countries in the region (the Congo, Angola, and so on), are many: protection of the supply of raw materials and oil in particular, control of the southern maritime routes, access to the heart of Africa via the Fernando Poo-Cameroon-Chad road, safe buffer zones for the protection of anticommunist southern Africa, and so on.

The Soviet Union, the other superpower, has also asserted itself as a new actor in the Central African region, one that generally counterbalances the action of the United States (Congolesse crisis in the 1960's). The Soviet Union, to use the expression of American W. Scott Thompson, constantly appears as the friend of African liberation, especially with respect to southern Africa.¹² The USSR now maintains diplomatic relations with several Central African nations: Zaire, Cameroon,¹³ the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, which are even more than cordial with the People's Republic of the

Congo, which has opted for "Marxism-Leninism." The People's Republic of China, which sees itself as the prototype of revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries, is also asserting its presence. For a very long time, it preached a takeover by force by dissident movements in the 1960's.¹⁴ It lends its aid in Central Africa to the dissident Union of Peoples of Cameroon, to the pro-Lumumba governments of the eastern province of the former Belgian Congo and the attempted takeover by Pierre Mulele. China has since promoted its bilateral relations with several countries in Central Africa: Zaire, Cameroon, the People's Republic of the Congo and Chad, with which diplomatic relations were established in November 1972. Other newcomers have definite influence on the perception of security needs: the Cubans¹⁵ and East Germans, presented as instruments of action of the Soviets, especially since the Angolan crisis. Countries such as Angola and the People's Republic of the Congo perceive a feeling of security over the presence of these friendly powers in Central Africa.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the other new actor in the region. Its action is aimed at rallying countries in the region to the Arab cause, at giving aid to liberation movements and ensuring the spread of Islamic culture.¹⁶ Libyan actions are not perceived as being without danger to the security of states in the region. Colonel Qadhafi's actions in Africa in general and in Central Africa in particular stem from the defense of Islam and the promotion of its progress, which is nevertheless perceived as a real danger to the security of numerous countries in the region with Christian or animistic (Zaire, Gabon, Central African Republic) majorities or those with religious splits (Cameroon). Attempts to convert chiefs of state in the region to Islam maintain this concern (Mobutu of Zaire in 1973, Ngouabi of the Congo and Bokassa of the Central African Republic)¹⁷ of seeing Libya expand Islam's influence in Central Africa. This Libyan action is manifested in Chad as the persistence of an Islamic thrust toward the south inherited from Senoussia: support to the Chadian Liberation Front, support lent to certain factions of the Chadian rebellion, backing for the National Union Government of Chad and the meeting on the Aouzou strip in Libya.¹⁸ The Third Universal Theory, which founds a new "system of government" aimed at resolving the problem of the government apparatus and the problem of the work-capital conflict¹⁹ obviously sounds subversive to leaders of countries in the region. One must add the alleged proposals of new Jamahiriya instigated in Tripoli that would violate the territorial integrity of some countries in the region (Chad, Cameroon): an Islamic Jamahiriya including Chad as far as Njamena, northern Mali and Niger, southern Tunisia, the former Spanish Sahara, part of Mauritania, eastern Sudan and Egypt; and an Islamic Jamahiriya of the Sahara including northern Cameroon and Nigeria, southern Chad, Niger, and so on.²⁰

The danger of local hegemonic aims is also part of the factors determining a security policy in Central Africa. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, a veritable economic, demographic and military giant,²¹ is the other nation neighboring on certain Central African countries (Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea). Its proximity leads one to fear the temptation to set up local hegemonic powers. Nigeria is allegedly seeking to impose itself as the only access to the sea for Niger and Chad. It has long criticized economic and monetary groupings of the French-speaking countries. The same feeling is perceived in Zaire, endowed

by nature with incomparable resources, another demographic giant on the scale of Central Africa.

The existence of the Republic of South Africa and the inhumane policy of apartheid it preaches and practices constitute the greatest danger to the security of the region of Africa in general. The policy of apartheid contradicts any feeling of human dignity. Through the implementation of the policy of the separate development of the races, it constitutes a dangerous attempt and a troubling precedent for all the Central African nations made up of human communities that are diverse ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously. For any African nation facing the delicate problem of national construction, apartheid is potentially subversive by virtue of its effect of ethnic and cultural alienation. The security of every country in Central Africa is affected by the problem. That security is indeed threatened by the overwhelming military superiority of South Africa. The weapons in the hands of the republic of apartheid, bought from the West or made under Western patents,²² place all Central African nations within range of South African military forces. That threat is all the clearer because the Republic of South Africa, aware of the essential role it plays on the Western economic scene, has proclaimed itself to be the policeman of the oil route which, starting at the Arab-Persian Gulf, goes through the Mozambique Canal and around the Cape of Good Hope. The deeds and gestures of the South African Republic help to increase that threat in Central Africa:

1 -- South Africa, supporting the dissident UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) for the purpose of destabilization, rouses the distrust of certain Central African nations, which see in it a violation of the principle of a ban on subversion aimed at established governments contained in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

2 -- The South African Republic often wields the idea -- an idea viewed as condemnable by the Central African nations -- of creating a constellation of Southern African nations including all Front Line countries and moving the frontiers of security of free Africa in Central Africa north (the Congo, Zaire, the Central African Republic, Cameroon).²³

3 -- South Africa has in the past been involved in Biafran and Katangan (Zaire) attempts at secession, thereby endangering the sacrosanct principle of the intangibility of colonial borders to which all nations in the area subscribe.

The purposes of the South Atlantic Pact,² which would involve Chile and Brazil together with the South African Republic, would also appear to be a danger to Central African nations.

Security in Central Africa remains more than a political concern. It is also an essential requirement in order to ensure the stable development of countries in the region. Consequently, this double concern has led to the drafting of a whole series of national security policies rather than doctrines strictly speaking. The main lines of such policies are less the work of the major nations than of politicians, the rule being established everywhere in Central Africa that weapons yield to the robe.

The main lines of these security policies are designed, through various international and national conduits, to provide a guarantee against conventional types of aggression and all other forms of aggression.

Part I. Policies of Security Against Conventional Aggression

The nations of Central Africa seem to have opted for a certain number of types of conduct to meet conventional aggression. Such conduct is not based on any doctrine as such, but rather, is made up of circumstantial reactions to the different outside and internal threats. One can group these government reactions around a certain number of policies, some of which are purely national, while the others call upon the cooperation of other countries or international organizations.

A. National Security Policies

Constitutional provisions generally empower chiefs of state to define national security policies and appoint them as the supreme commanders of the armed forces.

The nations of Central Africa, whether they call themselves progressive (Angola, the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe) or moderate (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire, the Central African Republic, Chad), on the whole base their national security policies on the concepts of national and people's defense, as well as on the need for peace and independence. The Central African region is in fact exposed to risks and threats of various origins: Its enormous economic potential, its position as a crossroads of East and West, North and South Africa, the conflict of geostrategic interests of the great and medium powers, and finally, the general political instability of the African continent which it has not been able to escape, make it a stimulating prey for different appetites. Vis-a-vis other countries, the independence and territorial integrity of the nations in the region often face grave dangers, while at home, the nation's peace and unity are just as frequently challenged.

Defense policies will therefore be mainly national in the sense that they will be based on the situations and requirements characteristic of the nations in the region and will in principle reject any blind imitation of other countries. These policies will also be aimed at a system of defense of the people because they propose to make that defense the affair of all the people. The chief of state of Cameroon thus explained his position on 15 August 1970 to a graduating class of the Armed Forces Military School of Cameroon (school to train officers from Cameroon and other African countries): "The threats we may have to face require means that only the people's defense can supply. The armed forces are not enough to save a nation, while a nation defended by the people is invincible." This conception expresses a choice, even if it is not original in itself because others, including the Chinese ideologists and strategists, had previously outlined it: The choice is that of a defense of the nation provided by all citizens of any and all levels.

It is within this framework that the national defense will have as its principal missions: meeting threats (the implementation and coordination of means

making it possible to face any situation at any time), deterrence, aimed at warding off aggression by persuading the adversary that such aggression would not be profitable, defense of the national territory when it is subjected to attack, and finally, participation in the fight against underdevelopment (activities of agricultural and industrial production, the completion of collective infrastructures, social action on behalf of education, health, sports and leisure, and so on).

With respect to structures for the conception of different policies, constitutional provisions grant chiefs of state supreme responsibility for the armed forces and the power to order a state of emergency, emergency regulations, general mobilization and therefore, in a word, the broadest possible powers of defense. Chiefs of state are aided by a number of organs whose number and functions vary from one country to another, but there is in all the nations in the region ministries of defense frequently headed by the chiefs of state themselves! One should point out that in Cameroon, in addition to specific powers of the minister of the armed forces, each of the members of the government is invested with special responsibilities in the area of defense defined by the law and the president of the republic.

Regarding the nomenclature of the armed forces, one distinguishes, outside of the specific case of Chad, the regular forces, which are permanent and divided into the forces for the maintenance of order (gendarmerie and police), the army, navy and air force; reserve forces, made up of groups of people with military training and armed for periods of reserve training or for military maneuvers or cases of danger; paramilitary forces generally made up of militias of the parties in power and civil defense groups; and, in keeping with the concept of the people's defense, the rest of the population, kept in reserve and urged to practice vigilance, unity and national cohesiveness, states of mind whose deterrent effect might turn out to be decisive in the face of possible danger.

The major requirement therefore remains that each nation be capable of providing for its own security. But are the countries in the region truly capable of this? The numerical weakness of the armed forces, the great expanse of territory to be defended and the paltry equipment resulting from the lack of resources available are all handicaps on the effectiveness of the different exclusively national systems of defense.

A few figures by way of example will illustrate: A country such as Switzerland, well-known for its pacifism and neutrality, can mobilize nearly 625,000 men in 48 hours. Another champion of pacifism, Sweden, can raise an army of 750,000 men in 72 hours. In Europe, there is 1 regular soldier for every .3 to 1 square kilometer of national territory to defend; in Cuba, 1 for every 52 inhabitants and .6 km²; in Israel, 1 for every 23 and .1 km². Central Africa looks pitiful in comparison: Zaire, with its 20,500 regular soldiers has 1 soldier for every 1,351 inhabitants and 722 km² of territory. With 40,000 regular soldiers, Angola thus has 1 for every 150 inhabitants and 31 km². The other countries have equally modest figures: 1,200 soldiers in the Central African Republic, or 1 for every 1,416 inhabitants and 519 km²; 1,250 soldiers in Gabon, or 1 for every 480 inhabitants and 213.6 km²; 8,000 soldiers in Cameroon, or 1 for every 1,062 inhabitants and 59 km²; 8,000 in Chad divided among 11 political

factions, meaning on the average 1 soldier for every 500 inhabitants and 160.5 km². Furthermore, the mobility of the troops suffers from heavy handicaps stemming from the very nature of the terrain (swamps, forests, deserts) and the poor road systems.

The equipment of the armed forces might have made up for or at least limit the harmful effects of these gaps, but such is not at all the case. Fire power is itself limited by the lack of heavy artillery, the poor air support and the small size of the armored units. And yet, one must point out a certain inequality in the distribution of equipment. While a country such as Angola can mobilize some 500 pieces of artillery (cannons, field howitzers and rocket launchers of all calibers), others have scarcely a few 60- or 81-mm mortars. If the power of a conventional army is now measured by the number of planes and tanks, certain regions in the region have never had a single tank, while others such as Burundi, the Central African Republic or Rwanda do not have a single war plane. As for those like Angola, Zaire, Cameroon, the Congo, Gabon and Chad, which can line up a few trainers or fighter aircraft their planes are for the most part slow and technically outdated. While a few years ago they might have been useful for light tactical support or in the anti-guerrilla fight, they are now ill-suited for such missions since the appearance of SAM 7 ground-to-air missiles carried on the backs of men. One must also add that these planes are often stuck on the ground because of the lack of spare parts, uncertainties of the ground infrastructure and inadequate maintenance. Tempted to settle a conflict with a neighbor by military means, a nation will often have to temper its warring ardor because of the scarcity of fuel needed to move its troops. One might therefore too rapidly conclude that there is a reign of "peace based on poverty" in Central Africa. Unfortunately, the persistence of armed conflicts in the zone leads one to less optimism.

It is definitely true that compared with the rest of the world, Africa is the continent that spends the least on national defense. By way of example, one might point out that in 1978-1979, 34 countries in the South Sahara devoted \$4 billion to their national defense, or scarcely more than the military budget of a little country not likely to make war, such as Belgium (\$3,636,000,000) and much less than Saudi Arabia (\$14.18 billion), France \$21.51 billion) or the Federal Republic of Germany (\$24 billion) during the same period. It is certainly also true that, compared with the rest of Africa, the central region is the one that on the whole spends the least for its armed forces, but based on the different gross national products, these military expenditures take on quite high proportions for economically poor nations. For the decade from 1966 to 1975, one finds the following annual averages for national military spending: for Chad, \$18.5 million for a GNP of \$410.9 million, or 4.5 percent of the GNP; for the Central African Republic, \$6.9 million out of a GNP of \$596.3 million, or 1.15 percent; for the Congo, \$17.6 million for a GNP of \$435.7 million, or 17.6 percent; for Cameroon, \$28.8 million for a GNP of \$1,483,000,000, or 1.94 percent; for Gabon, \$8.7 million for a GNP of \$767.7 million, or 1.13 percent; and finally, for Zaire, \$100.2 million for a GNP of \$2,323,000,000, or 4.37 percent (source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975, Arms Control Disarmament Agency, pp 20, 22, 24, 42, 54). One must also stress that a nation such as Gabon, which in the region

is a "power" based on its military budget, has an annual per capita income of \$2,240 and in 1979 spent \$40,461 per soldier, compared with \$42,215 in France, \$48,651 in the FRG and \$318,651 in Saudi Arabia during the same year (source: JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 982, p 43).

Given the many major gaps revealed in their national security policies, the nations of Central Africa have tragically become aware of the fact that they were incapable of individually providing for their own defense against outside aggression and even internal perils. They thus chose to call on foreign help through a series of preferential alliances with a number of powers outside the African continent or within the framework of attempts to organize their collective security, as provided for in Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter or other provisions of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

B. Policy of Preferential Alliances

This policy has resulted in a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements of military cooperation signed by Central African nations with Western countries, socialist countries or even other African countries outside the region involved.

Alliance With the West

The colonization of Africa was the exclusive province of Western countries. That common colonial past seemed to designate the West as the natural ally of African states to dangers of all kinds that might threaten their budding sovereignty. Thus it was that former colonial nations such as France, Belgium and Great Britain immediately signed military agreements with some Central African countries, subsequently imitated by the United States.

As early as 1960, France signed agreements with countries it had once administered in Central Africa (Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, the Congo), then with Zaire. Those agreements are often generically called military cooperation agreements. Actually, the label covers a double content: on the one hand, technical military assistance agreements and so-called defense accords. While technical military assistance agreements are aimed at aid supplied by France to the African governments for their own equipment and training, defense agreements concern the domestic and external defense of African nations and authorize France to participate directly, even in internal fighting.

In one of his articles in the periodical DEFENSE NATIONALE, Francis Carjean states that French technical military assistance is manifested in three forms: "assistance in personnel (advisers, instructors and technicians), logistical aid, through the supplying of equipment to national armies, either as free gifts or in the form of costly transfers, the training of foreign personnel at schools and training centers in France, whose limits reside in the capacity of those very organizations" (article by Francis Carjean, "Armee de Terre," in DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1978, p 171). As for the defense agreements, their mission goes beyond mere logistical support and the training of foreign personnel and is manifested in the form of the mobilization of French troops in the area of African military operations through the creation in

France of standing intervention forces in Africa or through the establishment of French military bases in Africa. The outside intervention units are the 9th Marine Division based in Rennes, Vannes and Brest (some 8,200 men and 1,850 vehicles of different types) and the 11th Airborne, assigned to Toulouse, Pau, Carcassonne, Bayonne and Castres (some 14,500 men and 2,200 vehicles). As for the French military bases, they are mainly in the Central African Republic (4,500 men) and Gabon (1,350 men) (sources: REVUE EUROPE-OUTREMER, No 571, October 1977; REVUE ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, No 38, March 1979). The number of these bases has therefore dropped in Central Africa with the disappearance of those once assigned to Cameroon and recently to Chad.

France thus signed an initial technical military assistance agreement with Cameroon on 13 November 1960, replaced by another so-called military cooperation accord on 21 February 1974 actually covering technical military assistance and defense. Concerning the other Central African countries, France signed an agreement with Chad on 11 August 1960, revised on 19 May 1964 and covering technical military assistance. That treaty was to be completed by a multilateral defense agreement signed by France with Chad on 11 August 1960; with the Central African Republic on 13 August 1960 and with the Congo on 15 August 1960. Gabon, which had already signed a single bilateral defense and technical military assistance agreement on 15 August 1960 with France, was to subscribe to the multilateral defense agreement on 20 June 1961.

Actually, most of these agreements expired with the general movement to revise French-African agreements that occurred from 1973 to 1977. The Congo thus released itself from any defense agreement with France by signing a treaty with that country on 1 January 1974 aimed at "technical cooperation with respect to the training of officers and the equipping of the People's National Army" of the Congo. On 12 February 1974, Gabon, in a new cooperation agreement, revised the clauses of previous defense agreements made with France. This situation is identical to that of Chad, bound by new agreements of 6 March 1976. Finally, with Zaire, France signed a general military cooperation agreement on 24 May 1974 relating to assistance and defense (source: Onana Ayissi Celestin, "The French Military Presence in Africa," paper for the Third Cycle Diploma in International Relations, Iric, Yaounde, 1980). Backed by this network of agreements, France has not only contributed to the training of African military personnel and provided equipment for the national armies, but has also directly waged military operations with its own troops in Central Africa, very often within the framework of internal conflicts of the nations concerned. It intervened militarily in Cameroon until 1964, in Gabon in 1964 in order to restore the overthrown former President Leon Mba to power, in Chad from 1967 to 1980, in the Central African Republic in 1979 to restore President David Dacko to power, and in Zaire in 1977 and 1978 at the time of the Shaba I and Shaba II operations.

Alongside France, other Western nations have enjoyed the policy of preferential alliances followed by the nations of Central Africa, to wit, the United States, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain and Greece.

The colonial past of Belgium in Central Africa (colonization of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi) predisposed that country toward such relations with

countries in the region. Thus it is that military cooperation agreements not only provide Belgium with the possibility of aiding the Zairian Army by sending Belgian troops in the case of outside aggression against Zaire, but also Belgian technical military assistance in the way of personnel. Belgium was therefore able to send army troops under highly controversial conditions on the occasion of the most recent events in Shaba in 1978. The Belgian Government also helps Zaire through the sending of military experts to advise the Zairian Army and Gendarmerie and through the training of Zairian military personnel, either at the Royal Military School in Brussels or locally at the Advanced Military Training Center in Kinshasa or the Kananga Officers Training School in Western Kasai.

One might also note that following another agreement signed with Great Britain, that country has trained a special Zairian unit known as the Inter-Armed Forces Military Troops at the Sandhurst Military School. As for the United States, its world policy as a great power prevents it from becoming directly involved in military confrontations in Central Africa. It prefers to go through its Western bloc allies, content to train certain military officers, particularly Zairian, in the United States and to supply countries such as Zaire with logistical aid and military equipment which it can acquire (the United States thus supplied heavy aircraft to transport French troops at the time of the war in Shaba).

One might also name Greece and Canada as the beneficiaries of the privileged alliances of the Western world with Central Africa, insofar as these two nations, along with others, provide training for flight personnel from the air forces of countries such as Cameroon. Likewise, the close interests connecting South Korea with the Western bloc allow us to refer here to Korean military assistance. Actually, following the shock caused by the events in Shaba, Zaire was led to sign a series of military assistance treaties with foreign countries including South Korea. The latter has thus had the mission, which it has since been accomplishing, of training Zairian recruits at the Military Training Center in Mitona in the Lower Zaire region near the port of Matadi.

As previously indicated, the policy of privileged alliances of Central Africa does not only concern the West. It also involves the socialist countries to which some African nations in the region have appealed in order to enable them to face the threats confronting them.

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[Text] Part II. The Alliance With Socialist Countries

Preferential alliances with the socialist world are characteristic of the nations of Central Africa that have chosen a noncapitalistic model of society that provides for the transition to socialism, or of those which, without making such a choice, have taken advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict within the communist world in order to confront the USSR backed by China. The African nations that have resorted to such alliances are mainly the Congo, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and finally, Zaire. The group of their partners is mainly made up of the USSR, the FRG, China and Cuba.

Soviet military engagement in Central Africa and mainly alongside Angola goes back to the period of the fight for independence between 1958 and 1975. That period is marked by deliveries of Soviet weapons (guns and munitions in general) to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of the movements fighting the Portuguese colonial system. Certain sources estimate those weapons deliveries during the 1960-1974 period to be worth \$27 million (source: DAILY TELEGRAPH, 11 April 1975, p 13). During that same period, a certain form of Soviet military assistance to the MPLA was manifested in the form of the training, starting in 1963, of a large part of the MPLA's officers in Algeria by Soviet military advisers aided by Cubans and Algerians.

Arms deliveries were naturally secret and went through Algeria and the Congo, then, starting in the 1970's, through Zambia and Tanzania. But the Soviet commitment would become more intense starting in April 1974, the date of the Portuguese decision to grant independence to its colonies in Africa: The fight for power in Angola actually succeeded the struggle against the colonial system and the rival movements of the MPLA generally got their arms from the Western countries and China.

The date of 11 November 1975 was proclaimed, amidst the general tumult, to mark Angola's independence. Deliveries of Soviet weapons then became massive, for the purpose of consolidating the MPLA regime in power in the Angolan capital, facing its rivals. By ship or special planes, the weapons unloaded were striking in their variety and abundance: armored personnel transport vehicles, antitank missiles, SAM 7 ground-to-air missiles, AA-2 "Atoll" air-to-air missiles, rocket and rocket launchers, AK 47 automatic rifles, T-34, T-54 and T-75 tanks, MI-8 helicopters, MIG-17 and MIG-21 fighters, MIG-15 UTI trainers, mortars, cannons, coastal patrol boats, MBT heavy combat tanks, and so on (sources: AFRIQUE DEFENSE, No 10, January 1979, p 40; "The Military Balance," 1978-1979, pp 45-46; REVUE USSR AND THIRD WORLD, Vol V, No 5, 1975, p 92; Legum Colin, Foreign Intervention in Angola," in AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD, 1974-1975, p 13).

Outside of Angola, the USSR had also granted military assistance to Equatorial Guinea between 1972 and 1979 under the regime of former President Macias Nguema and especially to the Congo (Brazzaville), which had proclaimed itself to be Marxist-Leninist. Soviet assistance to the Congo began in 1964 and transfers of weapons mainly dealt with the supplying of P-4 coastal patrol boats,

Ilyuchin IL-14 and IL-28 and Antonov AN-2 transport planes, MIG-15, MIG-17 and MIG-21 bombers and finally, BTR-152 armored personnel transport vehicles (sources: "The Military Balance, 1970-1971," p 47; "World Armament and Disarmament," Sipri Yearbook, 1972, p 129; AFRIQUE DEFENSE, No 1, March 1978, p 30, and No 10, January 1979, p 397).

To be operational, such equipment needs personnel capable of using it. Given the South African threats and those of the rival movement UNITA, the Angolan Government already had over 400 Soviet military advisers in 1976 and, according to certain Western sources, the Soviet military organization in Angola was deployed as follows in 1978: a head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola, with his command post in Luanda (a division general, aided by two brigadier generals), the command post of the city of Texeira de Souza for the eastern region, under the direction of four generals, the command post of Lubango for the southern region, under the direction of three generals, the command post of Vige for the northern region under the direction of a general, and finally, the command post of the Cabinda enclave, headed by a brigadier general (source: LE FIGARO OF 3 August 1978, p 2).

Nevertheless, the USSR refuses to take part directly in military operations in the field because of its interests as a great power. It is therefore content to supply the logistics, personnel being supplied by other countries to which it is connected, either by special agreements or the principle of proletarian internationalism. Among these countries is East Germany, which was already connected with the MPLA in 1973 by an agreement signed during the period of the fight for independence of Angola. In 1978, one could already count some 100 East Germans in Angola, including generals. That German personnel was in charge of security and political organization and, according to some sources, they even reportedly participated in the invasion of Shaba in Zaire (WASHINGTON POST, 8 July 1978, p 9).

But more than East Germany, it is Cuba that has supplied Soviet logistics with the most human resources. The Congo has 450 Cubans, including 300 soldiers, and Equatorial Guinea had between 300 and 400 in 1979, half soldiers and the others bodyguards (source: "Strategic Survey, 1977," p 14). And yet, it was Angola which, by virtue of the special risks it runs, had the right to the most abundant Cuban military assistance. One should first of all note that Cuba's military aid to Angola goes back to long before the Angolan independence. It began within the framework of Cuba's general relations with Africa, in 1961, with the arrival of the first Africans in Cuba for guerrilla-type training. At the time of his second trip to the Congo in 1965, Che Guevara took 125 Cuban volunteers with him to serve in Brazzaville as military advisers to the Simba rebels of the Congo (Leopoldville), supplied with Soviet and Chinese weapons. During that trip, a military assistance agreement was signed between Cuba and the Congo (Brazzaville), increasing the number of Cuban soldiers in Brazzaville to 700 and announcing the opening in 1966 of a guerrilla training camp for troops from the Congo (Leopoldville), Cameroon and Angola, with the aid of the Chinese and the Cubans. When, in 1970, the headquarters of the MPLA moved from the Congo to Zambia, Cuban soldiers also began to arrive in the latter country (source: Gibson, R., "African Liberation Movements," London Oxford University Press, 1972, pp 215-225).

It was not until 1975, with Angola's tumultuous accession to international sovereignty that Cuban military assistance to that country became massive and began to attract the attention of international and particularly Western public opinion. A few days after the proclamation of independence, on 27 November, Cuba landed an artillery regiment, a motorized battalion and infantry troops in Luanda, even before a real air bridge had been established between the two capitals. The number of Cuban soldiers operating in Angola thus went from 12,000 in 1977 to 23,000 in 1978 (sources: Levesque, J., "The War in Angola and the Role of the Cubans in Africa," in *ETUDES INTERNATIONALES*, Vol IX, No 3, Sep 1978, p 430; "Strategic Survey," 1977, p 14). If, in the final analysis, it is true that Cuban soldiers are wherever Soviet logistics are found, it is equally true that Cuba was already engaged in Africa, especially Central Africa, even at a time when its relations with Moscow were not very good (during the 1962-1968 period) and when the Cuban soldiers were alongside the Chinese (see Nzoyoum Nicolas, "The Soviet Military Presence in Africa, 1955-1978," thesis for the Master's Degree in International Relations, IRIC, 1978, pp 77 and the following).

Chinese military assistance to Central African nations began in the Congo as early as 1964 when that country declared its determination to build a socialist society. The Chinese were thus able to organize the Congolese people's militias, train youth movements in military methods and serve as instructors alongside the Cubans in guerrilla training camps opened to the opponents of Zaire and Cameroon, as well as to the Angolan MPLA. That aid was to change camps as a result of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and the Chinese determination to counter Soviet undertakings, the friends of the USSR thereby losing China's friendship. Thus it was that in December 1973, Chinese military assistance, which had already gone from the Angolan MPLA to the rival and pro-Western FNLA, was estimated to total hundreds of tons of arms going through Zaire and in 1974, China sent 120 instructors to Zaire to train the FNLA troops (source: Moundolock Ignace Bertrand, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," thesis for the Master's Degree in International Relations, IRIC, Yaounde, 1977). The number of those instructors was already 250 in 1975, when they were all recalled by their government and momentarily replaced by North Koreans.

Following the double invasion of the Shaba region by troops made up of Zairian opponents from Angola in 1977 and 1978, the Zairian Government, in the series of agreements it concluded at that time, also called on China, to the point that Zaire is the African country that receives the most Chinese military aid after Tanzania (source: Djilks, Patrick, "Military Aid From China, Israel, North and South Korea," in *LES ARMEES ET LA DEFENSE*, yearbook of Africa and the Middle East, 1980, pp 61-62). In 1977, China delivered 20 tanks to Zaire and then 40 more. At the same time, a group of Chinese advisers was sent to the Zairian Navy in June 1978 and two light patrol boats of the Shanghai class were delivered at the end of the same year. Finally, Zaire entrusted China with the officering of a new unit in Shaba specializing in the surveillance and protection of the borders.

And yet, Chinese military assistance extended to other countries in the region. Equatorial Guinea received light weapons and a small number of advisers, while Cameroon received two fast patrol boats of the Shanghai class in 1977. Finally,

one should note that the military assistance agreement signed with the Congo enabled that country to receive three vessels of the Shanghai class, four small boats for the river patrol fleet and 14 T-62 light tanks.

The policy of preferential alliances of the nations of Central Africa with respect to defense has worked in both directions, East and West. It has been manifested within the continent to the benefit of other African countries outside of the region of Central Africa.

Alliance With African Countries Outside the Region

This form of alliance is aimed at African countries with a relatively long military tradition behind them or those whose abundant financial resources enable them to acquire state-of-the-art military equipment and to risk following a medium power policy. The main African beneficiaries of the policy of preferential alliances are Morocco and Libya.

Morocco's military policy in Africa is older than one might think. Its first manifestation goes back to July 1960 within the international framework. Actually, to put down the secession of Katanga Province from the former Congo (Leopoldville), the United Nations embarked upon military action called UNCO (UN Congo Operation). Within the framework of that operation, the United States sent troops made up of national contingents including a Moroccan detachment. It was therefore within a known field of operation that, in March 1977 and June 1978, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces were found when they were sent to Zaire and effectively contributed to the survival of the regime of President Mobutu, endangered by the events in the Shaba. Concerning the other Central African nations, Morocco supplied military vehicles to Gabon in 1976 and subsequently, elements to provide a personal guard for the Gabonese chief of state. With the fall of President Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, it sent a contingent to guard the new Equatorial Guinean chief of state. Certain observers have claimed that Moroccan military assistance in Central Africa is explained, not only by the need for security of the beneficiary states, but also by Morocco's concern for countering Marxist advances and for consolidating the pro-Moroccan camp in the problem of the Western Sahara (see Constantin Francois, "The Difficulties of Afro-Arab Military Cooperation," in LES ARMEES ET LA DEFENSE, yearbook of Africa and the Middle East, 1980, pp 81 and the following). This is why somewhat military agreements between Morocco and other nations in the region should not be excluded.

While Libya's objectives are not necessarily the same as those of Morocco, one nevertheless finds the same concern for defense and security among Libya's Chadian partners. Chad is, in fact, the Central African country where Libya's military assistance has been the most obvious. Of course, Libya did sign a mutual assistance treaty with Rwanda in 1975 to cover cases of aggression or even a possible coup, but that treaty has never had any reason to be applied. Furthermore, Libya has in the past trained elements of the Central African Imperial Army, at the time of former Emperor Bokassa, but that Libyan military assistance was much more limited than the scope one would see in Chad.

In the eyes of observers, Libya's action in Chad has often seemed to be remarkably confused. Before Libyan aid was granted to the official government of Chad, it had been exclusively given to opponents of the Chadian legal establishment, meaning the members of the FROLINAT (Chadian National Liberation Front). Furthermore, support to the FROLINAT constantly fluctuated, going from one faction to another of the movement, depending on the periods and interests of the time. When the FAP (People's Armed Forces) faction of President Goukouni came to power with the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), it was precisely on the basis of the treaty of "friendship and alliance" signed on 15 June 1980 between Libya and the FAP faction that Libya's military assistance was granted to the GUNT. That assistance found further basis with the General Policy Statement of the GUNT published on 27 August 1981 and providing that: "with Libya, considering the historical, geographical and cultural factors that bind our two peoples on the basis of mutual respect, national independence and territorial integrity, will be developed...." Regarding the Libyan troops stationed in Chad, the GUNT pledges to request their withdrawal. A schedule for the gradual withdrawal of those troops will be drawn up by common agreement with the government of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (source: Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chad, quoted by Noudjiamlao Yossem-Kontou in "Libya's African Policy 1969-1980," thesis for the Third Cycle Diploma in International Relations, IRIC, Yaounde, 1981, p 123).

Libya's official military assistance to Chad has thus been expressed through the massive sending of equipment and troops and the opening of military bases in Ndjamena, the Chadian capital, Abeche in the east, Faya in the north and Mao in the west. Libyan troops, put at some 10,000 men, were also to take an active part in the victory of Chadian governmental troops against those of the FAN (National Armed Forces) faction in December 1980. The conventional Libyan military presence came to an end in November 1981, with the GUNT having resolved to make that decision under the pressure from within Chad and international opinion. That conventional presence gave way to the occupation presence which the Libyans maintain in the northernmost region of Chad, in the Aouzou strip, since the end of 1972, facing the deterrent presence of the French troops of the Operator Manta.

C. Collective Security Policy

The spectre of security has roused Central African nations to go beyond the framework of national defense policies and even that of bilateral alliances and rally to the concepts of collective security. That rallying is based on support for the principles of the United Nations and the OAU.

1 -- Support for Principles of United Nations

Whether it be within the general framework of the Organization of African Unity or the more limited framework of the various subregional organizations to which they belong, the Central African nations reiterate their unreserved support for the principles of the United Nations (see the different preambles of the charters of African international organizations). The provisions of the UN Charter of interest to us here because they deal with collective

security are Articles 51 and 52. The first of these two articles declares: "No provision in this Charter is contrary to the natural right of legitimate defense, whether individual or collective, when a member of the United Nations is the object of armed aggression...." In the second article, one can read: "No provision of this Charter is opposed to the existence of agreements or regional organizations aimed at settling matters which, dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security, lend themselves to action of a regional nature...." One can therefore state that it was backed by such provisions that they agreed, through their adherence to the entire Charter, that the Central African countries accepted and applied the principle of their participation in collective security actions within the African framework.

2 -- Support for Principles and Actions of the OAU

At the time of the constitutive conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa in May 1963, various concerns were expressed in the area of defense and security by certain speakers. At the prompting of President Nkrumah of Ghana, who returned to the problem after referring to it in previous publications, the chiefs of state of Ethiopia, Guinea and Uganda in particular mentioned the idea of the establishment of a joint High Military Command to take over the leadership of a continental army made up of personnel from the existing national armies. All emphasized the need for a reduction in arms on the world level and a denuclearization of Africa. These concerns caused them to pass Resolution No 4 devoted to "General Disarmament" starting with that early constitutive conference in 1963. In addition, the OAU Charter took up the problems of security, particularly in points 6 and 7 of the Preamble, in which it speaks of the importance of "creating and maintaining the conditions of peace and security" for nations, as well as of "safeguarding and consolidating their hard-won independence and sovereignty, along with the territorial integrity of our nations in the objectives of Article II, among which it names "Security and Defense," and in the specialized commissions of Article XX, including that of defense.

And yet, one should note that for the founding fathers of the OAU, the collective defense of Africa was to confront the colonial or racist powers in Africa and any form of extracontinental origin aimed at Africa. This concept was to evolve over the years and in accordance with the circumstances.

Whatever the case, the conference of chiefs of state and heads of government of the OAU, meeting in Accra, Ghana, in 1965, recommended the creation of an African Defense Organization. This recommendation remained a dead letter until 1974, when it was brought up again at the "summit conference" of Mogadiscio, Somalia, then in 1975, when the Council of Ministers reformulated the idea of the creation of such an institution. The problem arose again in 1977 on the occasion of the early events in Shaba. The fourth summit conference of chiefs of state of French-speaking Africa and their French counterpart in Dakar in April 1977 debated a new proposal for a system of collective defense, worked out within the French-speaking framework and called the African Intervention Forces. This proposal would resurface at the fifth French-African summit conference in Paris in May 1978, at the very time of the events in Shaba II. Confronting criticisms from various sources and from Africa

itself accusing certain African nations of trying thereby to place Africa under NATO's thumb and following the French proposal of February 1978 concerning a possible "Euro-African pact of military and economic solidarity," the proposal was never adopted, even within the French-speaking framework, and therefore never came into being. However, one should note that in that form, it received the enthusiastic support of certain Central African nations such as Gabon, Zaire and the Central African Republic.

But it was nevertheless Central Africa, with the Chadian imbroglio, that would give all of Africa an opportunity to implement a real system of collective defense. Two attempts turned out to be fruitless. In 1978, the Nigerian troops sent to Chad to interpose themselves as arbiters between the different rival factions were gradually repatriated without accomplishing their mission. In 1980, following Resolution AHG/Res. 101 (XVII), passed by the OAU summit conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the ad hoc committee on Chad resolved to send a peacekeeping force to Chad made up of the Congo, Benin, Togo and Guinea. The Congo alone sent a contingent to Ndjamena where, finding themselves isolated and tired of waiting for the other national contingents, the Congolese soldiers returned to Brazzaville.

Despite these two failures and that of the ministers of defense of the OAU, meeting in Addis Ababa in 1978-1979 to work out a common plan for the defense of the continent, the 18th summit conference of the OAU meeting in Nairobi passed a new resolution providing for the sending of an Inter-African Peacekeeping Force to Chad. It was that force which, made up of three contingents of 2,000 Zairians, 2,000 Nigerians and 650 Senegalese, would take over for the Libyan troops in Chad at the end of 1981 and actually deploy themselves in the field for the first time as a Pan-African force under the sole command of a Nigerian general officer and under the banner of the OAU.

At that level then, the Central African nations seemed thus far to turn their backs on the belief of former President Senghor that "the defense of Africa should be on the regional level." He had no theory or application of a collective defense limited to the region of Central Africa. In contrast, the nations of the region have always been a participant in any other proposal or action of collective security going beyond their regional framework. They therefore seem not to have absolute trust in a collective military system limited to their geographic zone and beyond their own national defense policies, they willingly open up to military alliances with nations in other regions: the East, the West or in Africa. Regarding security against conventional aggression, this conduct on the part of the Central African nations might cause the observer to wonder whether distrust of the immediate neighbor is not directed at the gaps and weaknesses of the latter or its appetite for power. But it is just as interesting to ascertain what these countries think and how they behave with respect to their security against other forms of aggression.

II. Security Policies Against Other Forms of Aggression

In a world now dangerous, the nations of Central Africa must, like all others, face the dangers of nuclear, bacteriological and meteorological aggression. How have they responded to such threats?

A. Unilateral Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

The security policies of the Central African nations regarding the nuclear threat are limited to unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons, expressed in their membership in nuclear disarmament treaties and promotion of the denuclearization of Africa.

1 -- Support for Nuclear Disarmament Treaties

By equipping themselves with nuclear weapons and mastering nuclear techniques, the old nations assert their will for national independence and the determination to defend their territories by all means. The temptation is great for all nations that have the means to do so. This is why proliferation has not spared Third World countries²⁴ and this is why Central Africa is not safe from the atomic threat.

Some of the international actors implicated in the problems of Central Africa either have nuclear weapons (France, United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union) or are considered as nations on the brink of having them (Republic of South Africa, Libya, Brazil and Argentina).

The Republic of South Africa, the main antagonist of the seven countries in the region, is considered as posing the main nuclear threat in the region. The republic of apartheid has long been considered simply as one of the countries on the brink of nuclear power. Along with the United States, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Gabon, Niger and the Central African Republic, it is rich in uranium mines. The Republic of South Africa is the third-ranking producer of uranium in the world (2,700 tons). Under the aegis of the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB), formed in 1949, the Republic of South Africa has undertaken to develop its nuclear program²⁵: chemistry, metallurgy, radiation, isotopes. South Africa has two reactors: Safari 1, supplied by the United States to Pelindaba, and Pelinduna Zero, which uses enriched uranium. A nuclear power plant was built at Koeberg (30 km from the Cape) by a French consortium in August 1976. The Pelinduna Zero reactor does not produce plutonium, but in August 1970, South Africa announced that it had perfected a "new and unique process" of enriching uranium at a lower cost. In August 1977, the Soviet Union informed the Western powers of the imminence of a South African nuclear explosion in the Kalahari Desert. Were these preparations followed by a secret explosion a few years later? Since that date, the South African atomic threat has haunted the African countries and particularly those of Central Africa. This is all the more true because the suicidal motivations of the Republic of South Africa, which claims to "rely only on itself" in the possibility of a communist offensive,²⁶ would cause it to equip itself with atomic weapons.

Brazil and Argentina would also constitute nations on the nuclear threshold that might threaten the security of Central Africa (proposed South Atlantic Pact). But the other atomic threat would come from Libya and would be particularly acute for the reasons already mentioned. Is that country in Pakistan's efforts to build the Islamic bomb?²⁷

Along with the development of conventional weapons, Libya is reportedly working on obtaining nuclear weapons. That country appears to be the main financial backer of the Islamic bomb in Central Africa: the purchase of 150 tons of uranium from Niger, the purchase of a Dutch centrifugal machine and a German rotor, and so on. One should add cooperation with the West German firm Otrag in building missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

And yet, the seven countries of Central Africa have chosen, despite these multiple nuclear threats, to give up atomic weapons. No country in the region is developing a nuclear arms program or seems ready to do so. On the contrary, these countries have unilaterally adhered to treaties limiting or controlling nuclear weapons or dealing with nuclear disarmament and without anything in return.

No protection of nuclear civil protection is in force in these Central African countries.

The policy of controlling nuclear arms has led to the conclusion of several agreements to which the Central African nations have adhered within the framework of a policy of collective nuclear security.

First of all, there is the Moscow treaty, which bans nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater (Moscow, 1963). The countries of Central Africa have expressly signed it: Cameroon (London, 6 September 1963, Washington, 27 August 1963), the Central African Republic (Moscow, 25 September 1965, London, 25 August 1965, Washington, 22 December 1964), Chad (Washington, 26 August 1963), Gabon (Moscow, 9 March 1964, London, 4 March 1964), for the signing, and Zaire (Moscow, 12 August 1963, London, 9 August 1963, and Washington, 9 August 1963), for the signing. It should be noted that the Congo does not seem to have joined.

The treaty on the principles governing the activities of nations in the exploration and exploitation of outer space, including the moon and other heavenly bodies, of 1967 places a ban on putting nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction there. It was signed by Zaire (Moscow, 29 April 1967, London, 4 May 1967, Washington, 27 January 1967), the Central African Republic (Washington, 27 January 1967), Cameroon (Washington, 27 January 1967). The United Republic of Cameroon (8 January 1969), the Central African Republic (25 October 1970), Gabon (11 February 1974), Chad (22 October 1970) and Zaire (4 August 1970) filed instruments of ratification of the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty that went into effect in 1970. Once again, the People's Republic of the Congo is absent from the list of parties adhering to that international legal instrument. It neither signed nor ratified the treaty on the ban on dumping nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction at the bottom of the ocean in 1972.²⁸ This latter treaty

was signed by Cameroon (Moscow, 11 November 1971), the Central African Republic (Washington, 11 February 1972). It should be noted that Zaire, Chad, Gabon and the Congo neither signed nor adopted by filing the instruments of ratification.

Most of the countries of Central Africa, with the exception of the special case of the Congo, have, despite the silence of their staffs, sought a guarantee against nuclear aggression in the policy of controlling such weapons. Is the Congolese abstention significant? Or in its own way, does it mark a certain reserve vis-a-vis that system of guarantee?

Certain actors involved in the geostrategic game of the region remain outside this system of guarantee through the control of nuclear arms. The Republic of South Africa, the main power opposing the nations of Central Africa, generally remains dangerously outside the system. It did not sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or the essential one on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The system of security through the control of nuclear arms may look, for the governments of Central Africa and politicians, like an international umbrella with holes in it, one exposing those countries to a South African nuclear holocaust or to the efforts of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers (USSR, United States, France, Great Britain).

2 -- Promotion of a Policy of Denuclearized Zones

The Tlatelobco Treaty (February 1967) tends to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America. It excludes the testing, use, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear arms by Latin American countries. No such thing exists in Africa. Resolution 1652 (XVI) of the UN General Assembly (24 November 1961), asking member states to "abstain from carrying out or continuing nuclear tests in Africa in any form whatsoever; to abstain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa to experiment, accumulate or transport nuclear weapons; to consider the African Continent as a denuclearized zone and to respect it as such." This resolution has been followed by others since that date.²⁹ They move in the direction of the Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the conference of chiefs of state and heads of government of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo from 17 to 21 JULY 1964. This policy of creating areas free of nuclear weapons is presented as contributing to the security of African countries. The nations of Central Africa subscribe to it. But the major problem here still resides in the Republic of South Africa's removal of certain of its nuclear activities from the international control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.³⁰ At the time of the meeting of the political commission devoted to disarmament, Cameroonian representative Oyono stated that it was the responsibility of nations equipped with nuclear weapons and to which the international community entrusts special responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security to put an end to the escalation and renew the dialogue in order to achieve the quantitative limitation of their strategic nuclear arms, inasmuch as the initiation of such a process might contribute effectively to the relaxation of international tensions and lead the way to general and complete disarmament under international control.³¹ This position essentially summarizes the position of the Central African nations with respect to their nuclear

security: trusting the international community and ensuring security through the control and mastery of nuclear weapons. Poor and underdeveloped, can these countries choose any other policy?

B. Search for an International Guarantee Against Bacteriological and Meteorological Aggression

The political and military governments and leaders of Central Africa are not insensitive to scientific wars, particularly biological and chemical warfare (see the lecture by General P. Semengue at the Ngaoundere Training Center in Cameroon for university students called up for their military training, 197?). Other forms of war have appeared with the development of science: meteorological aggression. How can the nations of Central Africa claim to ensure their security in the face of such aggression?

1 -- Adherence to Treaties Banning Biological Weapons

There is, first of all, the Protocol of 1925. This Protocol of 1925 concerns the ban on the use of asphyxiating, toxic and similar gases and bacteriological means in war. Biological weapons are those which use living organisms (bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, mycetes). Chemical weapons use toxic substances. Until 1978, this Protocol had only been ratified by the Central African Republic on 31 July 1970, which had signed it. The other countries: Zaire, Cameroon, Gabon and the Congo, follow the customary rules of the laws of war.

The Protocol of 1925 was completed by the convention on the ban on the development, production and storage of bacteriological weapons and toxins that has been in force since 26 March 1975. Zaire has signed and filed instruments ratifying that convention on 28 January 1977. This convention was also signed by Gabon (London, 10 April 1972) and the Central African Republic (Washington, 10 April 1972).

This treaty is the only one to foresee the measures of destruction and therefore of disarmament of existing biological weapons.

2 -- Guarantee Against Meteorological Aggression

The mastery and control of weapons have moved into another phase through the conclusion of the convention on the ban on the military or other hostile use of techniques of modifying the environment open to the signing of nations on 18 May 1977. This recent convention was only signed by Zaire in Central Africa.

It is foreseeable that the nations of Central Africa aware of this type of threat have no other choice than to seek an international guarantee, unable to divert their meager resources in order to develop a meteorological program.

Conclusion

"To rely on their own forces" and "rely on friendships in the West or the East": These are the main lines of the security policies of the nations of

Central Africa. These policies are accompanied by a search for an international guarantee against threats of nuclear or other forms of attack. These well-constructed security policies are in an unstable position in the face of the South African nuclear danger. Hope therefore resides in a policy of regional security backed by experiences of integrated regional development³² and probably involving the development of a collective deterrent policy of a "nuclear insurrection" against the republic of apartheid.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Academie Diplomatique Internationale, Dictionnaire Diplomatique," published under the direction of MAF Frangilus, Vol II from A to Z, article "Securite," Paris.
2. See "Atlas Jeune Afrique," pp 182-217, edition Jeune Afrique, under the direction of Regine Vanchi Bonnardel.
3. See "Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit International," Sirey, 1960, article "Securite, Securite Nationale, Securite Internationale."
4. See D. G. Lavroff, "The Strategic Importance of Africa, Yearbook on Africa and the Middle East, 1980, The Armed Forces and Defense," Paris, particularly pp 25-30.
5. See "Atlas Jeune Afrique," p 189.
6. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1095, 30 Dec 1981, "The African Subsoil Still Leads to Dreams."
7. F. Constantin, "Dubious Frontiers and Uncertain Leaders in Black Africa of 1974," "Annee Africaine," 1974, Paris, A. Pedone, pp 182-205.
8. See Ndifontah mo Nyamndi, "Cameroon-Nigeria Relations, 1958-1978," IRIC, Yaounde, Thesis for the Diploma in International Relations, 211 pages.
9. Noudjiamlao Yoosem Kontou, "Libya's African Policy, 1969-1980," IRIC, Yaounde, Thesis for the Diploma in International Relations, 1981, 219 pages, particularly pp 113-117.
10. See A. Bourgi, "Franco-African Cooperation: Senegal's Example," RGDC, Paris.
11. See Stephen R. Weissman, "The Destabilizing Threats of the Great Powers; the Case of the United States," in the "Yearbook of Africa and the Middle East, 1980, the Armed Forces and Defense," JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris, pp 39-43.
12. W. Scott Thompson, "The Destabilizing Threats of the Great Powers: the Case of the Soviet Union," in the "Yearbook of Africa and the Middle East," 1980, "The Armed Forces and Defense," JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris, pp 39-43.

13. See Djiena, "Soviet-Cameroonian Economic Relations, 1964-1979," Thesis for the Diploma in International Relations, IRIC, Yaounde, 1981.
14. A. Lhuisard, "China and Africa," DEFENSE NATIONALE, "Political, Economic, Scientific, Military Problems," June 1974, pp 89-107.
15. Nzoyoum Nicolas, "The Soviet Military Presence in Africa, 1955-1978," Thesis for the Diploma in International Relations, IRIC, Yaounde, 1979.
16. Noudjiamlao Yoosem Kontou, "Libya's African Policy, 1969-1980," Thesis for the Diploma in International Relations, IRIC, Yaounde, 1981, 219 pp.

Pierre Rondot, "Libya: From the Coup d'Etat of 1 September 1969 to the 'Government of the Masses'" DEFENSE NATIONALE, Paris, August-September 1979, p 69.
17. JEUNE AFRIQUE, "When Qadhdhafi Wants To Convert a Chief of State," No 1952, Paris, pp 16-18.
18. See details in MARCHES TROPICAUX, 16 February 1979, p 434.
19. See "The Green Book," Part I, "The Solution to the Problem of Democracy, People's Power," Cujas, Paris, 1976.

P. Rondot, REVUE FRANCAISE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES MEDITERRANEENNES, December 1970, pp 90-103.
20. P. Rondot, "Libya: Growing Interest for Africa South of the Sahara," No 86, pp 13-17.

Dahmanya, "A Dream That Begins in JEUNE AFRIQUE," No 1046, Paris, p 21.
21. Bernard Brionne, "Nigeria: Great African Power, DEFENSE NATIONALE, December 1973, pp 63-77.
22. DEFENSE NATIONALE, "Political, Economic, Military Problems," January 1975, pp 180-181: "The Republic of South Africa and the Western Countries" (Chronicle of B. Brionne).
23. DEFENSE NATIONALE, January 1980, pp 165-168 (Chronicle of B. Brionne and B. Guillerez), "The Constellation of the Southern African Nations."
24. See Ernest W., "Nuclear Weapons in the Third World," ECONOMICA, Paris, 1979, 161 pages.
25. Sipri, "Yearbook World Armaments and Disarmament: South Africa Nuclear Program," 1978, pp 70 and the following.
26. DEFENSE NATIONALE, "Political, Military, Economic, Scientific Problems," 33d year, March 1977, pp 21-26, by B. Guillerez.

27. Noudjiam Lao Yoosem Kontou, "Libya's African Policy, 1969-1980," Thesis for the Third Cycle Diploma in International Relations, Yaounde, p 78.
28. See all the information on these signatures in "United Nations Status of Multilateral Arms: Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," Vol II, 1977, p 104.
29. See the following resolutions: 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 3261 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3471 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 3169 of 10 December 1976, 418 (1977) of the Security Council, dated 4 November 1977, and 32/81, passed by the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1977.
30. See the letter presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency: "Nonproliferation and International Guarantees," published in Austria, 78-2071 (last page).
31. See CAMEROUN TRIBUNE, No 2217 of Tuesday, 3 November 1981, p 15. "United Nations: Cameroon Denounces the Nuclear Danger and the Action of Negative Forces."

11,464

CSO: 3419/75

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RICE IN WEST AFRICA: PROBLEMS, PROGRAMS

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 13 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

RICE: A QUESTION OF GROWING IT. Throughout West Africa rice has become a staple food, especially in towns. About 5m tonnes is eaten annually in the region. Of that, 3m tonnes at most is locally-produced. The rest comes mostly from the Far East and the United States, whose PL480 food aid during the past decade has included huge quantities of rice. In the 1960s rice imports to the region increased annually by 5%; in the 1970s they grew annually by 12%. In countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia, which quickly developed a taste for rice, per capita consumption in 1960 was about 26kg annually. Today it is 100 kg. With few exceptions, West African countries do not now have the foreign exchange to import enough rice to satisfy demand. Either people will have to eat traditional foods (the drought-resistant cereals like sorghum and millet, and cassava and maize) or local rice production will have to soar.

Nigerian head of state Maj-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida announced recently a ban on further rice imports. Within hours there was a massive run on remaining rice stocks in the country. Traders doubled, then trebled their prices. The *National Supply Company* in Lagos was besieged by anxious buyers. The hysteria is hardly surprising: in the early 1980s, under the aegis of the famed Umaru Dikko, Nigeria was importing about 1m tonnes of rice a year. Sierra Leone's incoming president, Maj-Gen. Joseph Momoh, has also threatened to ban imports once he officially assumes power later this month.

Certainly there is now a huge opportunity for potential local rice-growers. Only 45% of consumption is locally-produced, partly because of drought, but largely because of low government-controlled prices, corrupt, inefficient marketing boards and lack of resources for fertiliser. The latter is essential for high-yielding rice strains.

The *West African Rice Development Association*, set up by 11 West African countries in 1970 with the aim of making the region self-sufficient, has come to almost nothing. The member governments (now 16) usually pay their financial contribution late, if at all, and anyhow the association's advice is habitually ignored by governments whose senior ministers are sometimes more interested in taking a percentage from rice imports.

Though large-scale irrigation projects cost a lot to build and maintain, thus making irrigated rice extremely expensive, a few large projects are on the drawing board. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Chinese state company, *Agricon*, says it could establish an 8,000-acre scheme fed by two dams. It would employ 16,000 locals and produce hopefully 50,000 tonnes of rice. (Jamil Said Mohammed, the local tycoon, is involved in the scheme).

The best, if only, example of a large-scale irrigated rice project is in Gambia at Jahaly Pachaar, an area of traditional rice-growing. The 1,500-hectare scheme produced its first crop in May 1984. To the astonishment of even the expert Dutch advisory team from *Euroconsult*, the yield averaged seven tonnes per hectare - more than almost anywhere else in the world. Various plans are now afoot to establish a number of other rice projects, so that ultimately 30,000 hectares would be under irrigation. The

first step, a barrage across the river Gambia at Balinghor, would both prevent salinity creeping up the river during droughts and enable much better use of the fresh water coming downstream.

However, the Gambian project at Jahaly-Pachaar has two vital ingredients which might not always be available elsewhere in the region: foreign exchange to buy fertiliser (the IR34-450-1 rice from the Philippines and the BG90-2 from Sri Lanka must have a lot of it), and expertise (partly expatriate) to run the project.

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CSO: 3400/607

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

IGADD SUMMIT--The third ministerial conference of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), meeting on 15 and 16 November in Djibouti, confirmed that a meeting of the heads of state of the six member countries in this new organization (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) would be held next 15, 16 and 17 January. Unless one or both of them sends a minister instead, this could be the occasion for a potentially historic meeting between Presidents Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Mohamed SIAD Barre of Somalia. An IGADD secretariat has been set up with three commissions, having responsibility for administration and finance, planning, research and information, operations and coordination programmes. The operating budget has not yet been revealed. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWS-LETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

CSO: 3400/358

ANGOLA

NATION BUILDING UP MILITARY TO FIGHT SOUTH AFRICA

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 5 Dec 85 p 3

[Text]

PARIS — "Angola is building up its military forces to fight South Africa, Angolan commanders have claimed.

And they have revealed that Angola is buying French helicopters and British telecommunications equipment.

Threat

Commanders said increased air superiority was vital "in our fight against South Africa" and in the campaign to sever South African supply lines to Unita rebels.

And the navy is threatening action against "pirate trawlers" fishing in Angolan waters.

Air force commander Colonel Iko Carreira told the Paris-based weekly "Afrique-Asie": "It is absolutely essential that we wrest air superiority from South Africa.

"Before 1983 our idea was to have an air force capable of defending our urban and strategic centres and we spent more on anti-aircraft guns than on planes.

"We must admit that these guns, together with our army, did manage to stop South African invasion of Canene, southern Angola, in 1961 and 1983.

"But anti-aircraft guns are passive and we have to go over to the defensive and liberate the territory occupied by Unita and cut off its supply lines from South Africa."

Pretoria could deploy 200 planes and helicopters on the Angolan war front without taking them from other sectors.

The colonel admitted: "We have not yet reached our desired combat level — though we have been able to take on South African planes in dog fights. They are the ones who are avoiding all air duels in our skies."

He said the South African Air Force was using planes that were a generation out of date because of the international arms boycott.

Helicopters

He admitted for the first time that "we are buying French hel-

icopters and British telecommunications equipment."

Colonel Jose Codesse "Yoka Toka", commander of the Angolan navy, said: "We have to defend 2 000 km of coastline from South African naval operations mainly supporting terrorist action in our territory. They avoid open warfare.

"Although our navy is small it has made very significant progress since independence.

"But a major training programme mainly with the help of Cuban instructors, has given us a relatively high fighting capacity.

"It is true that the navy has not progressed as quickly as our army, but we are beginning to flex our muscles."

He said that one of his major aims was to halt the huge fleet of pirate trawlers fishing off the Angolan coast.

The Angolan Government has decided to make the MGPA, as the Angolan navy is called, responsible for protecting territorial waters in co-operation with coastguards and the fishing ministry.

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CSO: 3400/362

BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

SWAZI SPYING FOR RSA DEPORTED--A Swazi national who claims to have been trained as a spy by South Africa's security police has been deported from Botswana. Denis Thwala has unsuccessfully challenged his deportation order, saying he had been asked to work in Botswana for the South African security police. He told the court he would be prosecuted if repatriated to Swaziland. The court ordered his deportation to Mbabane this morning. It declared him a prohibited immigrant because he did not have means of support in Botswana. [Text]
[Umtata Capital Radio in English 1500 GMT 13 Dec 85 MB] /8918

CSO: 3400/620

CONGO

BRIEFS

SOVIET FILM SHOWINGS--In the framework of the scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of the Congo, the USSR Embassy in the Congo and the SOVEXPORT-FILM office in Central Africa, with the friendly cooperation of the Ministry of Culture and Arts and the National Cinema Office, will present a Soviet film week in Brazzaville from 6 to 12 November 1985. [Excerpt] [Brazzaville ETUMBA in French 26 Oct 85, p 10]. 9920

CSO: 3419/93

DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

FRENCH DEFENSE PACT--France has only just publicly revealed, in the official gazette of 10 November, the "provisional outline agreement establishing the conditions for basing French forces" in Djibouti. This agreement, signed on 27 June 1977, came into force on 31 October, 1982. Article one of the accord stipulates that the French troops stationed in Djibouti "can not take part in operations to maintain or re-establish order," while article four says the Djibouti government grants to the French armed forces facilities for all overflights, stopovers and aerial and maritime transit which they may require according to arrangements to be agreed. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWS-LETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 3] /9274

CSO: 3400/358

ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

EPLF APPEAL--The Eritrean People's Liberation Front appealed in a communique from its external relations bureau in Paris on 20 November to the leaders of the two superpowers to review their attitudes to Eritrea, recognise the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination and support the EPLF's settlement plan, including an internationally-monitored referendum. The communique said that U.S. aid for the late emperor Haile Selassie at the time of Ethiopia's annexation to Eritrea and the beginning of the war in the province, followed by Soviet aid to the current ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam to escalate the conflict, had resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 civilians, the displacement of half a million people, extensive material damage and the destabilization of the whole region. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 2] /9274

CSO: 3400/358

GABON

PROMISING OIL DISCOVERIES BOLSTER REVENUE

Dakar AFRICA in French Oct 85 pp 74-77

[Article by Jean-Pierre Challard: "Gabon: the Oil Recovery"]

[Text] The Japanese, a people who are both attentive to the secular traditions and beliefs and desirous of acquiring modern technologies and productivity, are aware of the beneficial value of oil discoveries. At Niigata, northeast of Tokyo, the people who live off the black gold respect and honor the god of oil: altars framed with saki containers made of fine porcelain decorate the offices, worksites and wells.

Now present on Gabonese territory, Mitsubishi and World Energy Development (Wed Oil) piously brought this practice with them, and it has not disappointed, because the two companies are profiting from gushing wells that they are exploiting together with ELF-Gabon acting as operator.

The Europeans managing, jointly with the Gabonese staff, the other companies smile amiably about this archaic Asiatic custom. Fie on these superstitions! Yet, if one studies the chronology of the two most recent finds, one cannot help noting a dual similarity in the operation of chance in these two events.

The land area of Sette Cama--a historic place where, say the scholars of the archives of Portuguese navigation, seven sailors died during an expedition and were given a religious burial--also has a history for the Shell-Gabon company.

In this prospecting area, named Ogoue, Shell is in principal the operator; however, in reality it works in association with two important partners: ELF-Gabon with 30 percent, and the national company ELF-Aquitaine (SNEA) with 20 percent. The impenetrability of the equatorial forest has never favored systematic prospecting in this area.

However, from July to September 1978, the ELF drillers, suspecting encouraging geological strata, went into this block (officially awarded to Shell) and produced the Mbari wells, which ultimately yielded water.

During this time, Shell's overall production was stagnating, like the figures for all of Gabon (see table). On 24 August 1983, a new company recently located in Gabon, Amoco Exploitation, put into production its Oguendjo offshore deposit--a crude different from the Lucina, Gamba and other Mandji.

In that year, the American drillers of Amoco pumped from the ocean 237,000 tons, and this rose to 976,000 tons in 1984, with the hope of producing 1,087,000 tons in 1985. This is a real challenge to the Anglo-Netherlands-Gabonese management of Shell. Was it luck, intuition, or genius? Shell gave an answer to Amoco by spending billions of CFA francs opening a road right through the forest to venture north of Gamba, its coastal headquarters.

After the bulldozers, steam-rollers, and dump trucks had reached the Rembo Eshira (from the name of a tribe of the center of the country), the prospectors set to work to drill the Eshira I well. A happy surprise for the men of Andre-Dieudonne Berre, the Gabonese chairman-general manager of Shell, a geologist by training: oil shows surged from the earth.

As evaluation wells Eshira II and Eshira III were going into operation, the official discovery announcement was made, in August 1984. Thus far, a year after the initial gush, the evaluation and economic study phase has not yet come up with an actual production figure; however, the Shell engineers agree in affirming that Eshira could produce much more than the 2,500 barrels a day obtained during the tests--a crude probably similar to the Bamba grade.

Benefiting from this formidable thrust through hostile and dense vegetation, these 125 kilometers of road and ditches--an umbilical cord linking the black gold adventurers to Gambia, often reinforced by helicopter flights with replacements and supplies--Shell continued further to the north, suspecting a geological structure operating as a container for hydrocarbon deposits.

Good news never comes singly, and in August the prospectors came upon other encouraging indications at the Rabi site, from the name of the river passing through this area. The production tests lasted 2 weeks, during which the surging crude was measured, analyzed, and then discarded. Total secrecy surrounded these operations, since the discovery was not made public until Saturday, 21 September 1985, by an official communique of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum in Libreville. According to standard practice, Shell added in this succinct text that studies were continuing to evaluate the commercial potential of the discovery.

At any rate, as things stand, it is indicated that in the production test Rabi yielded 445 cubic meters per day, a greater quantity than Eshira. An unusual aspect: the two sites are only 15 kilometers apart. The road ended at an oil strike.

Currently Shell is faced with another enigma: how to get all this crude out of the forest. It would seem that the engineers have two possibilities: either link the sites to the coast with a pipeline at right angle running east to west, in which case it would be necessary to build a special terminal to ship out the crude. Or, more logically, invest in a pipeline the length of this providential road, 125 kilometers, reaching the production facilities of the existing terminal of Gamba.

The leading Gabonese company in size, investments, profits and social achievements, ELF-Gabon is a virtual "locomotive" for the country's economy. In fact, it is reaping the fruits of a half-century of perseverance and

venturing in a field in which errors in judgment can cost billions of CFA francs.

Statistics continue to show ELF as the leading enterprise in oil exploration and production. While Shell was restoring its image by discovering the Rabi deposit, on land, the ELF technicians were returning to a sea area previously assigned to them.

Indeed, the prospecting permit for Inguessi, south of Port-Gentil and opposite Batanga, had been awarded to the American Amoco Oil prospectors, after the ELF drillers, disappointed by several dry wells, had turned their rights back to the Ministry of Mines.

Within less than 2 years, the Texans George Trump then Ralph Young brought the first gusher, which made them laugh to think about the intelligence of the "Frenchies," graduates of the French Oil Institute, there outside Paris...

The ministry reduced the zone in converting it to a production zone, as is normal practice, and the Oguendjo deposit began producing without a hitch its 21,000 barrels a day to the profit of Amoco Gabon, in partnership under this permit with Preussag, Lingen, British Petroleum and Petrogab.

The British engineers of British Petroleum, suspecting other neighboring deposits, proposed to the Amoco teams to continue prospecting in the same area. The latter did not believe in a repeat discovery and chose to give up their rights, while directing their search much more to the south.

Then the ELF geologists resumed their seismic studies and drillings and in August 1985 encountered solid indications in the permit area renamed Eyena. Three gusher tests confirmed this vein, yielding a test quantity of 600 cubic meters a day at the Vaneau well, with the possibility--honestly recognized--of subsequent loss of pressure.

The secret, kept from the public from August to September 1985, was not released until the board of directors meeting in Paris on 24 September. Under this Eyena permit, ELF will share the profit with Hispanoil and SNEA, while serving as the operator. It should be noted that in Gabon there are only three operator oil companies: Elf, Shell and Amoco, despite the multitude of partners of all kinds.

ELF, by luck or by calculation, is proceeding normally from discovery to discovery, without giving loud publicity of the new gushers. Between January and December 1984, ELF had carried out a half dozen exploration and evaluation drillings in Gabon, not without result.

The Konzi field was put in production in January 1984 at the rate of 1,000 cubic meters per day, while development of the Eaudroie Marine field was completed in July 1984. At present, this well is yielding 1,200 cubic meters a day, but a drop in its output is expected.

In regard to discovery, the oil people usually take a cautious attitude for obvious reasons. The investment required for development of a deposit is so great that it puts a serious strain on production costs. Also, if world

consumption continues to be reluctant and the prices continuously decline, the companies prefer not to hurry, or even to "freeze" the deposits for a time.

Also, the governments operating off these resources tend to draw on the reserves: it is so tempting to demand an advance on future "royalties" or a tax on profits based on the production forecasts. In short, it is a matter of the state gaining substantial sums from the oil companies, which the latter are obviously unhappy about.

Moreover, one wonders whether in the case of a new discovery the government is not prompted by other motivations: each oil potential has an influential psychological effect on the country's economy. Confidence is revived or increases, the financiers open the valves of the credit banks, and businessmen become active in all directions, convinced that sooner or later this manna will fall on their affairs.

In the view of the Gabonese second deputy prime minister, Etienne-Guy Mouvagha Tchioba, "these discoveries increase that much more Gabon's oil reserves and our longevity as a producer." He recalled that some pessimistic spirits were predicting only a short while ago: "In 10 years there will not be a drop of oil in Gabon."

However, he noted that since he was appointed to this post as minister, there have been three to six new discoveries per year, a respectable figure. In his view, this means primarily that the Gabonese mining realm is still not well known and is underexploited, despite the increasing efforts in this direction (mining inventory).

The oil minister emphasized: "The oil companies have confidence in the Gabon government, and this production increase is a just reward for their huge investments." Currently, the country is obtaining 180,000 barrels per day from its ground.

This figure, it should be noted, is above the level "advised" by OPEC as of last December, or 130,000 barrels per day. However, the Gabonese authorities, considering that their crude exporting capability is minimal compared to the quantities of the major oil-producing countries (OPEC is currently selling 15 million barrels a day), has not adhered to the recommendations of that organization in the direction of limitation.

"At any rate," Mouvagha Tchioba said, "the share calculations vary depending on known and proved reserves, and nothing prevents Gabon, in the light of these new facts, from requesting a revision of its real quota." Also, he added, the USSR and Egypt have just substantially increased their prices; so how, under these conditions of market fluctuation, can there be agreement on set quantities and stable prices?

It is certainly still too early to judge the impact of these new deposits on the Gabonese economy, especially since other factors must be taken into account, such as the rate of the dollar (the currency in which oil billing is made). It is evident, however, that the increase in oil revenues, which amount to 63 to 67 percent of the annual state revenue of Gabon, will be producing smiles among the people in the Ministry of Finance.

Gabonese oil production, already at 7,969,000 tons in 1983, continued its breakthrough with 8,815,000 tons in 1984, thanks to the Konzi, Mbya and Oguendjo deposits. One can count on, perhaps not in 1985 because of the busy months before going into actual production but at least in 1986, Gabonese production going up another notch.

In the meanwhile, we know that the 1985 figures will be better than those of 1984: that is no doubt the reason why the state--despite a total foreign debt of 390 billion CFA francs--contracted capital loans abroad that turn out to be larger than its debt repayment.

However, this did not prevent the excellent minister of economy and finance, Jean Pierre Lemboumba Lepandou, from announcing far and wide that "Gabon has already entered the post-oil era," a matter of persuading his colleagues to cut back their operating expenses.

9920

CSO: 3419/93

GABON

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION--The rapid action group of the national gendarmery, based at Owendo, was informed on 24 September, by a person who asked to remain anonymous, of the presence in our waters of a boat containing more than 20 people. The security forces immediately went to Barracuda beach, where the suspects had already landed. Major Bondo's men combed the woods along the shore and apprehended one by one 22 illegals, of whom 19 were Malians, two Senegalese, and one Guinean. Upon interrogation, the group said that it had always been their dream to live in Gabon. In regard to the organization of the journey, these "fans" of our country revealed the existence of a well-organized traffic operated by the citizen of a neighboring state. The Guinean told us the story of his journey. When he left his country more than 3 years ago with the intention to go to Gabon, he made successive stops in Abidjan, Lome and Lagos, from where he joined Kribi in Cameroon. It was there that he came in contact with the operators of the traffic. The cost of being transported by dugout between the Cameroon city and Libreville varies from 50,000 to 100,000 CFA francs, depending on the period. Once they have reached Gabon, the illegals are naturally taken care of by their compatriots already living there. [By Ebang Owono] [Text] [Libreville L'UNION in French 1 Oct 85 p 3] 9920

CSO: 3419/93

GHANA

TOGO BLAMED FOR QUADRAPARTITE MEETING FAILURE

London TALKING DRUMS in English 25 Nov 85 p 25

[Text] Ghana has criticised Togo for causing the three-day meeting in Lagos of foreign affairs, trade and justice ministers of Ghana, Togo, Nigeria and Benin, to end in deadlock.

A statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr Obed Asamoah, on his return from Lagos, said that Togo's delegation had come to the meeting solely to mount a propaganda offensive against Ghana, stating that the primary interest was to indulge in rhetoric by accusing Ghana of being behind recent bomb explosions in Togo. Despite the deadlock the meeting had agreed that consultations should continue.

Meanwhile, a radio Ghana commentary has noted that the unsuccessful story from the Lagos conference serves as a big blow to the positive steps being taken by member-countries to forge closer ties and co-operation in the community.

The commentary regretted that Togo's accusation of Ghana being behind the recent bomb attacks in Lome is, to say the least, uncalled for, if not unfounded. If on the other hand the Togolese authorities had cause to suspect Ghana, they could have looked for better and appropriate avenues to register their protest. To have gone beyond that to deceive Ghana into attending a meeting which was supposed to be sacred to the December Lagos accord to combat economic crime in the four countries, was in itself a stab in the back, the commentary added.

/13046
CSO: 3400/637

GHANA

NEW BRIDGE DESIGN RELIES ON LOCAL MATERIALS

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 17 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by Kwaku Nehemia]

[Text]

THE Building and Road Research Institute (BRRI) in Kumasi has successfully designed a new model of bridge using 100 per cent local resources and raw materials as a positive attempt to accelerate the construction and rehabilitation of feeder roads in the country.

This follows the commissioning of the institute by the Ministry of Roads and Highways to design a new bridge for the country's highways.

The new bridge designed under a technique known as "Mechanical Laminated Timber Girders", will now open way for Ghana to construct wide and very long span wooden bridges unlike the existing ones whose breadth and length are limited.

What is even peculiar about the new bridge is that it can be knocked-down and the components sent to the project site for re-assembling.

According to Dr. Isaac Allotey, Senior Research Officer of the BRRI, who was speaking in an interview with the 'Graphic', the institute has constructed some of the new bridges and a careful study is being undertaken to know their behaviour pattern.

This, Dr Allotey said, would then be reduced into a system of equation to serve as the basis for the construction of more of the bridges.

The Senior Research Officer noted that results so far obtained from the study are favourable and positive and expressed the hope that the study would be completed by the end of next month.

For a start, it is expected that the bridges would be used on feeder roads and later on highways after they have proven to be extremely good and durable.

/13046
CSO: 3400/353

GHANA

NEW BREED OF ORANGES DEVELOPED

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 6 Nov 85 pp 1, 5

[Article by Samuel Kyei-Boateng]

[Text] **RESEARCH** conducted by the University of Ghana Agricultural Research Station (ARS) at Okumaning near Kade has produced a breed of oranges which can bear fruits in three years instead of the normal five or more years.

The station has also discovered a breed of oranges which bear fruits throughout the year as against the seasonal ones produced by the traditional farmers.

These are the results of intensive research work started in 1960 by the Research Station into the possibility of developing citrus varieties which produce high yield and good quality fruits and which are also resistant or tolerant to the tristeza virus disease.

Mr J. K. Osei, Research Officer in charge of the ARS, told the "Graphic" at Okumaning yesterday that the research work followed the failure of the first attempt towards large-scale citrus cultivation in Ghana which were undertaken at Asebu and Aduana in the Central Region where lime plantations were established between 1930 and 1940.

He said by 1952, most of these plantations had been destroyed by tristeza virus disease which is endemic in the country.

Mr Osei noted that by 1970, the ARS had discovered that two citrus species, namely rough lemon

and cleopatra mandarin conferred high degree of tolerance to tristeza virus infection to sweet oranges and a variety of tangerines and grapefruits.

He said it was also discovered that when sweet oranges were budded onto the rough lemon and cleopatra root stocks, the resulting plants matured within a period of three years and produced high yielding plants for more than twenty years.

For this reason, the station established a small nursery to produce limited quantities of high yielding, early maturing and disease tolerant citrus seedlings to interested farmers.

The station, he stated, also discovered that almost all the local citrus cultivars are infested with several other citrus diseases, therefore, free citrus cultivars were introduced into the country from leading citrus producing countries and were established at the ARS.

Some of the varieties and their ripening periods are as follows: Late valencia sweet orange — January to March, satsuma mandarins — April to June; ponkan mandarins — May to June, Washington navel — June to July, Lake Tanganyika — June to July, Local Sweet Oranges — August to November and navelinas — December.

Mr Osei emphasised that the institute has established a strong base for the development of citrus juice

industry in Ghana and therefore urged the government to encourage large-scale orange production to play a significant role in the national Economic Recovery Programme since the crop has a high demand on the world market.

When this is done, it will end the over-reliance on imported drinks which is a drain on the economy, he added.

The Research Officer disclosed that his outfit is negotiating with the Bank of Ghana for financial assistance for the expansion of the nursery to produce more planting materials for farmers, adding that farmers who are interested to embark on large-scale citrus plantations for their livelihood must contact the ARS for assistance. The station also offers free training for farmers together with free accommodation.

He pointed out that unlike the local method of growing oranges whereby the farmers sow the seeds which have short life span, the budded plants are high-yielding, free from thorns, easy to harvest and have long life span.

Asked if the oranges planted with chemicals were not bitter, he replied that the bitterness subsided when the fruits are ripe.

GHANA

ASSESSING ERP IN TERMS OF FOOD CROP OUTPUT

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 13 Nov 85 p 3

Article by K. Abaka Quansah]

[Text] **MAN cannot live without "bread", so goes an adage. Quite apart from the adage, however, the traumatic experiences Ghanaians went through in 1983, make it imperative and appropriate to start an assessment of the first phase of the economic recovery programme from the food crops sub-sector of the agricultural sector.**

The recovery programme was launched in 1983 against a backdrop of abysmally low agricultural output in the latter 1970s and the early 1980s.

Requirements

In 1982, we produced only 60 per cent of our food requirements, as compared to 83 per cent in 1984-86 and 71 per cent in 1978-80.

Further, compared with output levels in 1974, the peak year of the Operation Feed Yourself programme, maize production in 1982 declined by 35 per

cent. Rice output dropped by 67 per cent, cassava by 50 per cent, and yam by about 67 per cent.

The progressive decline in food production was the conglomerate effect of inappropriate pricing policies, untimely, and sometimes non delivery of strategic inputs and drought.

The recovery programme has been aimed at arresting the decline in food production in the short-run and achieving food sufficiency in the long run.

Precisely, the short term thrust lies in the government's desire "to reduce reliance on imports by maximizing domestic production of cereals, especially maize and rice".

Towards this goal, the PNDC has been in action since 1983, ensuring that farm inputs are made available to farmers and at the appropriate time.

Import licence has been regularly allocated to the matchet factory for the importation of raw materials for the production of matchets. Consequently output of cutlasses increased by 180 per cent in 1984 compared with 1983. The supplies of fertilizer and improved seedlings, have been substantially improved.


Prices

The situation, as obtained in the recent past, where agricultural prices were set with the sole aim of making basic food items available at 'give away' prices to the urban communities has changed. Currently, prices of farm products are pegged at levels that will ensure adequate incentives for more productive work.

Improvements in the transport sector, especially the road transport sub-sector, as well as in the supply of fuel, have had salient effect on the ability of farmers to market their produce.

Consequent to the implementation of the policy guidelines on food crops, as contained in the programme, food crops output increased by 10 per cent in 1984, compared with the corresponding output in 1983. Between 1970 and 1982, on the other hand, agricultural output declined at an average rate of 0.2 per cent per annum.

Given however, that 1983 was a particularly bad year, as far as food output is concerned, a comparison of output levels in 1983 and 1984,



will not give a fairly good picture, of how far, in all modesty we have come from the gloomy days of the recent past.

Perhaps, a comparison of 1984 production figures with their corresponding levels in 1974 may be more appropriate.

Compared with 1974, maize production in 1984 increased by 20 per cent, and cassava output by 13 per cent. On the other hand, rice production plummeted by 39 per cent.

However, estimates for this year indicate that a substantial headway has been made in rice production. Production in 1985 may well be about 30 per cent more than that of the past year.

Further, yam production has gone up substantially. The estimate for the year is about equal to the output recorded in 1974.

Graph A shows the output of rice, maize and all cereals (maize, rice, millet, etc.) between 1980 and 1984, as well as their estimates for the current year.

The graph shows that to a fairly good extent, the progressive decline in cereals production has been adequately contained, and that the recovery programme's objective of reducing "reliance on imports by maximizing domestic production of cereals, especially maize and rice" has been more than half-way met.


Graph B also indicates levels of cassava production from 1980 to 1984, as well as the estimate for the current year.

Increase

The estimate for the year shows an increase of more than 70 per cent over the production figure for 1982.

Though a lot remains to be done, it cannot be denied, with production statistics as the basis, that a fairly good work has been done.

Nonetheless, the estimate for the year's output of maize is about 16 per cent below the projected figure for the year as contained in the programme.



At the other end of the spectrum, the year's estimate for rice production is about 3 per cent above what the programme projected. Cassava output estimate for the year also shows a 25 per cent increase over the programme's projected figure.

The lagging of this year's estimated output of maize behind the projection made in the programme, can be explained by the fact that the slump in maize price as a result of the bumper harvest in 1984, has resulted in farmers reducing the acreage they had previously put under maize cultivation.

Also the year's rain pattern during the major maize season was not as fairly distributed as that of the last year.

At the end of the day, when the assets are juxtaposed to the debits it becomes abundantly clear, that the sharp increase in the production of cereals, cassava and yam among others are a result of the general response to the first phase of the recovery programme which has entailed expansion in acreage under cultivation, and the removal of most of the serious bottlenecks which have direct effects on production.

We have not, repeat not, however reached the peak of our production capacity with regards to food crops.

GHANA

ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECTS

Mangoase Road Repair

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 7 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Salome Donkor]

[Text] Under the joint leadership of the area CDR and the local Youth Association, the people of Mangoase in the Eastern Region are rehabilitating a 19-kilometre link road from Mangoase to Adawso through communal labour to facilitate the haulage of foodstuffs from the area to marketing centres.

The road has not been motorable for the past two months. As such, foodstuffs were getting rotten on farms while cocoa could not get to the Mangoase depot to be transported by rail.

Traders who want to get to Akuapem area have to go through Koforidua, a distance of over 40 kilometres.

Taking newsmen round to see the state of the road on Monday, Mr Victor T. Doku, Organising Assistant of the Akuapem District zone four CDR, said the worse part which needs urgent attention is the three-kilometre Mangoase-Pakro junction road.

The Organising Assistant has appealed to the regional branches of the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) and the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) to resolve the issue of which should work on the road and come to their aid since the extent of damage is too serious to be repaired by manual labour alone.

He assured that the people are ready with an appreciable quantity of bags of cement and other materials for the project.

Soldiers Repair Afram Plains Road

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 7 Nov 85 P 8

A detachment of the Field Engineers Regiment of the Ghana Army has completed rehabilitating and gravelling 25 kilometres of the Afram Plains road from Akeamanfrom (Kilometre Eight) towards Forifori.

This forms part of the first phase of the 80-kilometre stretch which involves providing culverts at river crossings and swampy areas and gravelling soft sections.

This was disclosed by Mr Martin Hmensa, Eastern Region Engineer of the Department of Feeder Roads, to the GNA at Korforidua on Tuesday when he spoke on the extent of work done on the Afram Plains road.

Mr Hmensa added that the Field Engineers Regiment had already completed reshaping the portion of the road from Tiase (Kilometre 50) to Donkorkrom (Kilometre 80).

A total of ₦20 million being the value of work done to date had already been paid to the regiment with nearly ten million cedis spent on materials such as chippings, fuel and lubricants and hiring equipment.

Mr Hmensa commended the regiment for the excellent work done so far in spite of the many odds which scared off other contractors who earlier showed interest in the project.

He mentioned some of the odds as lack of water and the huge cost of transporting equipment and materials across the Kwahu Ridge and the Afram River, with the attendant delays because of the frequent break-down of the ferry craft.

However, Mr Hmensa observed, the Afram Plains possess great agricultural potentials which could be harnessed through mechanised farming and the government was determined to ensure that the area was made easily accessible.

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CSO: 3400/348

GHANA

BRIEFS

ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECTS--Members of the Odoben branch of the Democratic Youth League of Ghana (DYLG), have almost completed rehabilitation work on the 12-kilometre road linking the town to Agona Nyakrom. The road which was in a very poor state was threatening the flow of traffic from that area to Agona Swedru. [By E.A. Andam] [Excerpt] [Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 13 Nov 85 p 8] The half-kilometre road linking Ekumfi Ekotsi and Bogyano, both villages in the Central Region, would be opened to traffic by November 24. According to Major Abraham Sam (rtd), Under Secretary for Roads and Highways, work on the road has been completed. [By Mavis Quaicoe] [Excerpt] [Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 19 Nov 85 p 8] The chiefs and people of Adjikpo-Yokunya in the Manya Krobo district are rehabilitating roads in the area to facilitate the transportation of goods and services. The roads are the Atua-Kpong main road and 24 kilometres of feeder roads connecting the main road. So far an appeal to the people of the area by Nene Tibo Paditey, Chairman of the Atua Government Hospital Visiting Committee to contribute to the project either in cash or kind has been receiving favourable responses. The highest donation of £200,000 came from Mr J.W. Adjower Donkor, Managing Director of Emalike Contract Works who has also repaired a bridge on the road between Somanya and Krobo Odumase at a cost of £40,000. [Excerpt] [Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 20 Nov 85 p 8] /13046

CSO: 3400/347

GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

COOPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH SWEDEN--[Dateline indistinct] (AFP)--Sweden is to grant Guinea-Bissau 140 million Swedish krona (\$1 to 8.37 Swedish krona) for the next 2 years, according to a cooperation program signed on Monday between the two countries. This program concerns particularly rural development, small-scale fishing, industry, trade, telecommunications, and the payment of Swedish technical assistants in Guinea-Bissau. The agreement was signed by Bernardino Cardoso, Guinea-Bissau's secretary of state for cooperation, and by Tom Tscherning, director of cooperation at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since it attained independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has received more than 600 million Swedish krona from Sweden in the form of grants. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1435 GMT 16 Dec 85 AB] /8918

CSO: 3400/620

LESOTHO

TIES WITH YUGOSLAVIA STRENGTHENED

Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

THE Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr Ralf Dizdarevic says that he is confident that his visit to Lesotho shall give impetus to the establishment of broader cooperation between his country and Lesotho.

Speaking at reception hosted in his honour by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr V. M. Makhele on Sunday, Mr Dizdarevic said that Yugoslavia appreciates the Contribution of Lesotho to the struggle for the independence of African countries in the struggle against the remnants of colonialism and in particular against racism and apartheid.

Mr Dizdarevic observed that his country and Lesotho are linked by common interests and views on international relations.

He pointed out that the two countries belong to the movement of non-aligned countries and said that this gives them strength to endure all hardships they may be exposed to.

He said Yugoslavia has always given full support to the struggle of the people of Africa for final freedom and overcoming the difficult economic situation it faces.

Mr. Dizdarevic said that he believes that one day the world would witness the final liberation of South Africa from the evils of apartheid, oppression domination and aggression.

He stressed that Namibia would also be free and independent.

Speaking on this occasion, Mr. Makhele said that although Yugoslavia and Lesotho are far apart and have different social systems they are both developing countries faced with the difficult task of maintaining peace and development. He recalled that the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two countries in 1974 opened a new chapter in the annals of friendship of the two countries.

The Minister remarked that over the past years the two countries have continuously enhanced their mutual cooperation and achieved positive results and said he is convinced that the friendly ties will be strengthened because unity is strength.

LESOTHO

FINNISH MISSION MAKES FAMILIARIZATION VISIT

Maseru THE COMET in English 23 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] A three-man project identification mission from Finland spent two days in Lesotho on a familiarization visit of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries to review the role played by donors in the organisation.

Their mission also included making proposals for projects to be financed by FINNIDA a Finnish aid giving organisation.

While in Maseru they met the Acting Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing Mr R.L. Nkotoane who briefed the mission on avenues open to Finland assistance.

He said the Lesotho government attaches great importance to the development of forests for provision of fuel wood.

He pointed out to the mission that Lesotho is particularly interested in labour intensive projects to absorb mineworkers who are being threatened with dismissal from South African mines.

During its stay in Lesotho the mission flew over Mokhotlong and also observed work undertaken by Woodlot project.

They also had discussions with officials of the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining.

The mission consisted of the Finnish Ambassador to Lesotho Dr Kari Mustanoja, a consultant and Mr Goran Haldin an in-house consultant.

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CSO: 3400/359

LESOTHO

PEKO CALLS FOR CREATION OF JOBS

Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] THE Minister of State in the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining Mr. Z. J. Peko says the present situation in Lesotho calls for harnessing and utilization of all known unknown natural resources to create more employment opportunities for Basotho.

Addressing a pitso at Ha Tlhakoli in the Leribe district last weekend, the Minister appealed to all Basotho to join hands to achieve economic viability and self-sufficiency in food production.

He urged Basotho to continue to support the Basotho National Party (BNP) as they did in the last elections because the BNP has always been

committed to the welfare of the nation.

Mr. Peko concluded by appealing to the chiefs and their subjects to co-operate with the peoples militia and security forces in the maintenance of peace in the country.

Speaking on the same occasion, the Public Relations and Publicity Secretary, Mr. H. M. Mots'oene said the overwhelming victory of the B.N.P. in the last election was in no small measure due to the able leadership of the Prime Minister, Dr. Leabua Jonathan.

Mr. Mots'oene commended the Basotho electorate for their political maturity which made them see through the smoke-screen of deceit

and empty promises of the opposition parties in preparation for the elections.

He said the Basotho owe a debt of gratitude to the B.N.P. and its leadership for its consistency in ensuring continued freedom of worship, and freedom of press in Lesotho which has allowed even the opposition leaders to make destructive criticism of the government, a situation that is not found in many African countries.

Mr. Mots'oene said the government had always supported and strengthened the monarchy and the chieftainship against the threats of destruction by the opposition parties.

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CSO: 3400/359

LESOTHO

HEALTH MINISTER'S WARNING REPORTED

Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

THE Mohale's Hoek hospital authorities and the District Coordinator have been urged to ensure that outsiders do not interfere with the health workers in various centres of the district.

THE warning made by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Health, Morena Napo Matela followed allegations that outsiders from other departments or groupings encourage the removal of certain health workers from their areas of work for allegedly being uncooperative.

The Minister was leading a delegation of five government officials on an inspection tour of the Mohale's Hoek government hospital complex. They also met the staff.

Morena Matela said whenever there was a complaint about an employee, proper channels must be followed and the employee's case be dealt with first by appropriate authorities within the district.

NEW HOSPITAL

Speaking about the proposed new hospital for Mohale's Hoek, the Minister advised the Coordinator and the Head of the hospital to decide immediately on a location for the hospital.

He promised that as soon as the project took off a new mortuary would also be built.

PATIENTS

The Minister said he had also learned of certain employees who ill-treat the patients and that some of these employees have made it a habit to help themselves and their families on food supplies intended for the patients.

He said this behaviour was uncalled for and must come to an immediate end.

Other members of the delegation were the Minister of State for Transport and Communications, Mr Utloang Mohale, the Director of health services Dr Arabang Maruping, Mr Lian Molets M.P., the Chief Nursing Officer Mrs Rosalia Kuoe.

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CSO: 3400/359

LESOTHO

ADB FINANCES WATER SUPPLY PROJECT

Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

LESOTHO is to receive a loan of M30 million from the African Development Bank (ADB) to finance phase two of the Maseru water supply project.

The loan agreement for the project was signed in Abidjan, Ivory Coast on behalf of the government by the Lesotho High Commissioner to Kenya Mr. B. A Sekhonyana and the Vice-President of the Bank, Mr. D. Bihute.

Phase two of the Maseru water project is aimed at raising the present capacity of Maseru system. It will also provide some interior measures to improve the water supply to Maseru and Roma.

Mr. Sekhonyana said phase one of the project had tremendous impact on the lives of the community of the city of Maseru and pointed out that phase two would result in a substantial impact too and general socio-economic life of three centres it would serve and would in no small way ensure improvement in the services provided to communities surrounding these centres.

The ADB Vice-President said the bank was committed in helping Lesotho realise her development objectives, stressing the bank's satisfaction that

the Moshoeshe I international airport was implemented within the agreed expenditure executed accordingly.

Mr. Bihute observed that there were practical problems with regard to the Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Programme which the bank had hoped would be overcome after a team of experts to be dispatched to Lesotho soon will have held discussions with Lesotho government over the project.

He emphasised the bank's commitments to assisting Lesotho to strengthen and restructure the water supply and sewerage division of the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining as it recognised the important role played by the division in the overall water supply development effort.

LESOTHO

MAKOA: FARMERS MORE RECEPTIVE

Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] The Minister of Agriculture and Marketing, Mr. D.P.G. Makoe says that the fact that crop research is today conducted on the farmer's land makes the farmer more receptive of crop production knowledge and skills.

Opening a four-day international seminar on agricultural research in Maseru on Monday, the Minister said that the crop research division of the Ministry of Agriculture had secured for Basotho farmers, a new variety of beans "The Pinto" from America.

Mr. Makoe said this variety can be grown with very good results in Lesotho and that it matures within a short period. He said one other important aspect of the variety is that it can be sown late in the season.

The Minister expressed his appreciation for the expertise of CIMMYT Company of Mexico for producing a variety of the white flint suitable for the mountains of Lesotho.

The seminar was attended by participants from eastern and southern African countries and is conducted by experts from Mexico, United States and Nigeria.

/13046

CSO: 3400/359

LESOTHO

REGIONAL EFFORT NEEDED TO CUT FOOD SHORTAGE

Maseru THE COMET in English 23 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

THE Minister to the prime Minister, Mr J. R. L. Kotsokane says that due to the importance of food shortage question, not only the cooperation of several ministries is needed but regional effort is vital.

Opening a regional workshop on Institutional Feeding held in Maseru this week, the Minister said this workshop could not have come at the right time especially in view of the prevailing food shortage and famine facing most of the African countries.

Mr. Kotsokane reiterated the importance of having enough food not only as a means of re-
tainment but also to curb the severity of diseases caused by malnutrition.

He urged African countries to cooperate economically, politically in order to fight hunger.

He said the government of Lesotho has subsidised agriculture in the country by 30 percent.

He stressed the importance of education to people on food and nutrition and on this issue appealed to donor agencies for support in the implementation of other deliberations of the workshop.

The workshop ends today and is funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Countries represented are Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Swaziland, Seychelles, Mozambique, Malawi, Mauritius, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

The FAO representative to Lesotho, Mr. J. A. Mudavadi in his welcome speech advised that food crops should be given first priority than cash crops. He added that African nations of not eating certain foods should be reviewed as many people are hungry despite plenty of food.

/13046
CSO: 3400/359

LESOTHO

NATION'S JOURNALISTIC LOSSES EXAMINED

Maseru THE COMET in English 23 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by Mike Mokomeng]

[Text] THE year 1985 will go down in history as a year of great achievements and great losses in the field of journalism in Lesotho.

In July this year, the first ever independent daily newspaper, The Nation, was born but two months later it sadly fell prey to a devastating monster that devours newspapers in this country.

In September another independent weekly, Lesotho News, hit the streets, but it was never seen again after its third issue.

However, it was later learned that Lesotho News is still in the "operating theatre" undergoing some major changes which will make it different from what it is today.

According to the highly-placed sources, the newspaper will totally take a different direction in terms of content and format.

Meanwhile, plans are in the pipeline to launch yet another independent news paper some time early next year, according to knowledgeable sources in Maseru.

But there is one thing that baffles people about the short lease of life of newspapers in this country.

Highly-informed sources in Maseru indicate that since 1968 more than 20 newspapers and periodicals were registered in Lesotho.

Some of these newspapers did not take off the ground while others survived for up to one issue only and were never seen again.

Others staggered and slowly marched towards the grave for some months and ultimately died a natural death.

One of the first Basotho to be bold enough to launch his own newspaper Mr Theodore Sello Ntoampe, told THE COMET that some serious measures were to be taken to rescue "our newspapers from going down the drain".

Mr Ntoampe who launched his own newspaper, Mafube, in the 1950s after having worked for the South African Bantu World and Lesellinyana in Lesotho, blamed the incredible collapse of newspapers in the country on mismanagement,

financial problems and lack of trained and talented personnel.

His newspaper closed down because of financial constraints after having been in existence for one and half years. The last edition was set at the Morija Printing Works and printed at the Mazenod Printing Works as workers had downed tools demanding pay increments.

Mr Ntoampe who went to study journalism at a United States university and then to Canada where he earned a Bachelor's degree in history after the collapse of his newspaper, joined the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting when he came back home.

He later joined a teaching service and is now seriously contemplating launching another newspaper if funds permit, because he believes that time is ripe for any ambitious newsman to embark on such a project.

LESOTHO

BRIEFS

PARLIAMENT CONGRATULATES PM--The Lesotho parliament this week passed a motion congratulating the Prime Minister Dr. Leabua Jonathan for "his far-sighted diplomatic wisdom." The motion tabled by Morena Halemakale Mots'oene said Dr. Jonathan had made many good and loyal friends for Lesotho in the east and west to the disappointment of the prophets of doom. The motion further requested Dr. Jonathan to accelerate the establishment of diplomatic ties on a residential basis with more countries. [Text] [Maseru THE COMET in English 30 Nov 85 p 8] /13046

IFFTU SUPPORT--The International Federation of Free Trade Unions and its affiliates, have said they will extend their fullest solidarity to the Lesotho Federation of Free Trade Unions, to help it establish employment creation projects. This follows threats by South African government to repatriate foreign workers in that country. The General Secretary of the International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Mr Jihn Vanderveken said his organisation has sent the strongest possible protest to the South African government against the proposed repatriation of migrant workers. He said they were also rallying their affiliates to increase pressure on their respective governments for immediate and substantial increase in assistance programmes for Lesotho and other front-line states. [Text] [Maseru THE COMET in English 23 Nov 85 p 8] /13046

LIVESTOCK OWNERS WARNED--Livestock owners from villages along the Leostho-South African border in the Mafeteng district have been warned to stop grazing their animals in adjacent South African farms. The warning was made at the week-end by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Interior Morena Masupha Katiso. [Text] [Maseru THE COMET in English 23 Nov 85 p 7] 13046

BORDER HOLDUPS PROBED--An inquiry has been launched by the Department of Communicat-on and Public Works into the running of the Ficksburg Bridge customs post. The probe was launched after complaints that traffic between Lesotho and South Africa moved slowly because of shortages of personnel and facilities. The mayor of Ficksburg, Mr Timon Janssonius, said the pre-Christmas period was the busiest time of the year. "As in many South African towns, the recession has caused several businesses to go under, but if the traffic flowed through the border more easily, trade would boom," he said. Mr Janssonius, who is also chairman of the Ficksburg-Leribe Liaison Committee, said Basutho people had held back their money during the drought. "Now that there have been good rains in the Maluti Mountains--allowing them to plant their crops--they want to spend their money," he said. He said he had made a personal inspection of the border post--the second busiest in South Africa after Jan Smuts Airport--and found it needed facilities such as electronic detecting screens. "It takes ages for customs officials to search people one by one." [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 5 Dec 85 p 14] /9274

CSO: 3400/362

LIBERIA

INAUGURATION COMMITTEE FORMED FOR RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 29 Nov 85 pp 1,3

[Text] The Head of State and President of the Interim National Assembly, CIC Dr Samuel K. Doe, has appointed a 12-man special inaugural committee with immediate effect.

According to Press Secretary Patrick E. Kugmeh, the Special Inaugural Committee headed by Foreign Minister T. Ernest Eastman among other things, will ensure the preparation and coordination of all activities relative to the successful holding of the ensuing January 1986 inaugural ceremonies.

Finance Minister G. Alvin Jones is co-chairman.

In a letter to the Foreign Minister yesterday Dr Doe hoped that the committee will utilize its efforts in accomplishing the task entrusted "as time is of the essence."

Other members of the committee are: Hon James Burphy, Minister of Public Works; Hon John Bestman, Director of the Budget; Hon Andrew Redd, member INA; Hon Clarence Momolu, Director-General GSA;; Ambassador J. Adolphus During, Chief of Protocol, R.L.; Hon Peter Naigow, Director-General of the Cabinet; Archbishop George Daniel Browne, Archbishop Episcopal Church of Liberia; Mrs Aletha Johnson-Francis, Managing Director, LPMC and Rt Rev H. Victor Stryker, Pastor, Presbyterian Church of Liberia.

Others include: Ambassador James E. Morgan, Ambassador Gabriel Myers, Chief of Protocol, EM; Hon J. Eustace Smith, Deputy Director-General, ELBS; Hon Varnie Holmes, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs; Ms Maude Smith, Assistant Minister of Youth; Hon Cecilia Towah, Assistant Minister of Postal Affairs; President, Liberia Marketing Association, Mrs Imogene Collins, Ms Miatta Sherman, and representative, National Bureau of Culture and Tourism.

/9312

CSO: 3400/357

LIBERIA

FOREIGN MINISTER APPEALS TO ASSEMBLYMEN-ELECT

AB051215 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 2000 GMT 4 Dec 85

/Excerpts/ As you may have heard in the headlines, Foreign Minister T. Ernest Eastman today officially informed representatives- and senators-elect from the various political subdivisions of the country of their election to the national legislature in the Second Republic. During the ceremony which took place at the Foreign Ministry in Monrovia today, Minister Eastman presented separate letters to members of the national legislature officially informing them of their election. Here is the foreign minister:

/Begin Eastman recording/ Our election was held 15 October when the Liberian people exercised their election prerogatives. Based on the results of that election, Secom /Special Elections Commission/ made the announcements and, based on those announcements, certain distinguished citizens of our country are now given the historic assignment of lawmaking.

As you know, our government is a triangular /as heard/ government: lawmaking, as the legislature; law interpretation, as the judiciary; law execution, the executive.

In a sense, a nightmare has ended; a nightmare that goes so many months back. And (?reaching) the (?stage) of our election, as all of you know, was a difficult exercise. We were infested with rumors. We were infested with utterances. Sometimes it is better not to say something if you feel you will create problems. There is a woman, the particular woman, her name escapes me now. But more than 4,000 years ago she said: Let thy speech be better than thy silence, or be silent. And many times our speeches should probably have not taken place, our utterances are /words indistinct/ of ourselves and may cause problems, problems for all of us. And so this nightmare has ended. But perhaps what has emerged more socially, is that we are one people. And all of us should understand that we are one people. As Bishop (Bownes) /words indistinct/ said: If our finger, a single finger hurts, the entire body suffers. /End recording/

Minister Eastman also reminded members of the legislature of their responsibility in the Second Republic to maintain law and order.

/Begin Eastman recording/ With our new government, we believe it would be your responsibility, when you look at the three aspects of government, to maintain

law and order. But to maintain law and order with compassion and with justice. The head of state has asked for reconciliation. It would be unfair to say that this reconciliation request was made after the coup attempt, because I recalled when I was asked to come and serve my government and my people 2½ years ago, it was 9 July 1983, to be precise, one of the requests I made to the head of state was that we should resume 26 July as a day of reception in commemoration of our independence. He attended that reception and his speech dealt with reconciliation and reconstruction. He extended invitation to a large spectrum of our citizens. Many of them did not attend, and many of them did not believe the reconstruction and reconciliation utterance. I think if we had started then with that kind of attitude many of our problems would have been avoided.

If I may as a humble citizen be permitted to make another observation: We believe that all the members of our parties will take their seats, and we believe that all of them will speak as their conscience directs them, and this will enlarge the structure of our people, and of our government, and of our society. Sometimes when you look at flowers, the more complexions there are, the more beautiful the flower, the whole flower, turns out to be. And I believe also that given the realities of the election, it is not possible but that all the structures as represented in our legislature will form a dynamic part of our society. /Sentence as heard/

Ladies and gentlemen, it can't be anything other than this. All of us are Liberians. It is the only country we have! This is the only country we know, and I am sure this is the only country all of us love. /End recording/

/12228

CSO: 3400/627

LIBERIA

FOREIGN MINISTER EASTMAN CONSIDERS MULTIPLE ACCREDITATIONS

AB061416 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 2000 GMT 5 Dec 85

/Excerpts/ It looks as though the final retirement and retrenchment decision will be made next Tuesday. It can be recalled that about 2 weeks ago, the head of state, CIC /Commander in Chief/ Samuel K. Doe, gave a directive that all unproductive government employees be put down and those of retirement age be retired. So far, only the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor and John F. Kennedy Hospital are on the list. Well, just how will this affect the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Minister Eastman explains:

/Begin Eastman recording/ I (?think) the framework and the information that has been provided on the basis of the decision to do what is being done have not been adequate enough for the public. Shall I say it is the responsibility of our ministries, more than one, to get the facts across. Firstly, our economy is an ailing economy. Our /word indistinct/ is virtually worthless. We are in debt and the international people, people who are insisting that we pay. /Sentence as heard/ In other words, we have to work toward preparing the document that will turn our economy around so that we don't look from month to month for paying salaries. That will involve the budget, the private sector, the public sector, agriculture, and a wide spectrum of things that our country and our people must go into. Now one of the suggestions that has been made from abroad is that the government must take certain bold decisions. There are many of those decisions that have to be taken. One such decision is that our government has more people working for it than normally governments around the world have. It seems that almost everybody is employed by the government, and if we are asking for help from abroad from international institutions or so and so, we must bring the employment level in our government down to what is reasonably expected of our government.

The question now is how you go about it? Because there are some people who have given the best years of their lives only to their government, and the government ought to have a conscience and to be responsive to people of that kind. Therefore, if you are making retirement, you have to ensure that they get the reasonable pension to which they are entitled. It is not something that you are giving just out of the gratefulness of your heart; it is something which they have earned.

Now to answer your question directly, they are people abroad. It is going to be difficult for us because quite frankly, our embassies abroad are understaffed. But having said so, I have to look and see whether it is not possible given the reality of the international banks insisting all on what we should do, whether we cannot have multiaccreditation. By that I mean my people might be residing in country A and I accredit them to country B and country C. When I was ambassador in Kenya, I was also accredited to Tanzania, to Uganda, to Zambia and to Madagascar. So we have to look into that and then in the process try and see how we can reduce. But it is not an exercise that is magical. It will take me many days, many weeks, to look at it. It has to be quantified; not only retire them, but you've to provide money for them to come home. Many of them have their families with them. Some of their children are in school. Now does this time, /words indistinct/ for their school abroad or what? All these things have to be looked at, and that's what my people are at present doing. /End recording/

/12228

CSO: 3400/627

LIBERIA

SECOM CHAIRMAN ON POSSIBLE NEED FOR BY-ELECTIONS

Monrovia FOOTPRINTS TODAY in English 12 Nov 85 pp 1,10

[Text] Elected members of political parties who take seats in the National Legislature despite their expulsion from the parties would be considered as "independent members" of the Legislature, says Counsellor Emmett Harmon, Chairman of the Special Elections Commission (SECOM).

[Words missing] yesterday, Chairman Harmon noted that it would cost "extra funding" to finance the by-elections, and stated that such elections would be authorized by the Legislature before they are conducted by the Commission.

He indicated that when authorized by the Legislature, the by-elections would be conducted in the various counties where those who may refuse to take the seats were elected for representation during the October 15 general elections.

It is however unfortunate, Chairman Harmon said, that some political parties have decided to reject any of their members who would take the seat in the Legislature without taking into consideration the future of the country.

Last week, the Liberia Action Party (LAP), the Liberia Unification Party (LUP) and the Unity (UP) jointly decided that none of their members would take the seats "allotted" to them in Legislature due to the alleged "glaring irregularities" they claimed were allegedly perpetrated by SECOM during the elections.

Among the three parties, LUP has called on SECOM to nullify the results of the October 15 general elections which gave the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) a landslide victory, and hold new elections with the participation of the international community as observers.

However, Chairman Harmon told our reporter yesterday that he goes along with the opinion of the Justice Minister, Major Jenkins K.Z.B. Scott, that new election cannot be held.

It is "absolutely impossible", Chairman Harmon said, to hold another for the Second Republic, "because the results as announced on October 29 are factual, authentic and genuine."

He pointed out that it may be assumed that those elected to the Senate and House of Representatives on the tickets of LAP, UP and LUP "are not party members," adding that their election by the people during the elections could be a result of their contributions made in the past to the church, state and humanity.

Chairman Harmon recalled that the Head of State, the Bishop of the Episcopal Church, the Most Rev. George Browne and the pastor of the Providence Baptist Church, Rev. Peter Amos George, among others, have appealed to the three opposition parties to take their seats in the Legislature.

He said these appeals were designed for the sole purpose of "unifying this country and building a good future, "hoping that the opposition parties would "put Liberia first" and adhere to the appeals.

In an answer to a question, Chairman Harmon said SECOM and the "patriotic and loyal Liberian people will not tolerate the lawlessness of LAP which claimed victory of the elections."

He noted that LAP had reported to the Liberian people what it called the "authentic result" of the general elections, showing a total of 162,000 Liberians who voted, adding that according to LAP's alleged "authentic report" this figure represents "only 20 per cent registered voters" as compared to the more than 519,000 registered voters reported by the Commission.

LAP, he alleged, seems not to only be "undermining and subverting the process, but have used very strange and cunning methods to mislead the Liberian people through deceit and fraud."

Chairman Harmon, stated that the Commission will in the course of this week, address itself fully to this and other issues raised by LAP and other political parties.

/9312

CSO: 3400/356

LIBERIA

LAP PLEDGES PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Monrovia FOOTPRINTS TODAY in English 20 Nov 85 pp 1,8

[Text] The Liberia Action Party (LAP) which had previously declared that it will not take the 11 seats it won in the National Legislature, is now ready to participate in a government of national unity, says Counsellor Tuan Wreh, National Chairman of LAP.

Additionally, Chairman Wreh noted that his signature could be withdrawn from the joint complaints filed to the Special Elections Commission (SECOM) recently by LAP, the Unity Party (UP) and the Liberia Unification Party (LUP) in which the three parties complained of alleged irregularities during the October 15 general elections.

Counsellor Wreh said this last Thursday when he turned himself in at the Executive Mansion in response to an announcement that he, as well as other officials of LAP and other political leaders should report to the Executive Mansion and that government could not guarantee their safety if they failed to do so.

In a Monday night "television conversation" with the Head of State and President-Elect, CIC Dr Samuel K. Doe, the LAP Chairman said the Executive Committee of LAP had already planned a meeting last week Tuesday morning to reach an unanimous decision so as to ensure that the party participates in a government of national unity when the November 12 abortive invasion occurred.

A Senator-elect for Grand Kru County, Counsellor Wreh added that he had also scheduled a visit to that county to ascertain from his constituents who elected him to the Senate whether or not he should take his seat in the National Legislature.

Noting that there were already "government pressure, and constituents pressure". Tuan Wreh said it was most important for him to confer with "my constituents" because "they elected me to represent them".

In the presence of the Chairman of SECOM Counsellor Emmett Harmon, the Vice President of the INA, Dr Harry F. Moniba and other high ranking military and government officials, Counsellor Wreh told the Head of State that the

Executive Committee of LAP would have met to decide to let by-gones be by-gones, saying, "you can have the presidency, and we shall take our seats."

Earlier, Counsellor Wreh denied his party's involvement in the abortive invasion led by former Army Commanding General Thomas G. Quinwonkpa to overthrow the Head of State and his government.

He pointed out that as far as he was concerned as Chairman of LAP, there was no occasion during which the party ever discussed plans to allocate funds for a group of mercenaries to overthrow the government.

Counsellor Wreh's denial made to the Head of State and others present during the "television conversation" came in the wake of the confession made by one of the captured rebels, Major Anthony McQueen, that the November 12 incident was a result of dialogue between LAP and former commanding general Quiwonkpa.

According to Major Anthony McQueen, LAP would have provided \$25 million for the entire operation with each rebel getting \$100,000 if they had successfully invaded the country and overthrown the government.

Major McQueen said the Montserrado Senator-elect of LAP, Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, should have met with General Quiwonkpa on November 4, in the United States to finalize the negotiation. But Mrs. Sirleaf did not go to the United States because she was denied an exit visa by the Justice Ministry and the Bureau of Immigration.

However, Counsellor Wreh said: "MY hands are clean, I do not believe in bloodshed I am not in the financial circle, and I am a poor boy."

He said his jurisdiction over members of the Executive Committee of LAP only lies within the confines of their meeting sessions, adding that he does not have control over their personal affairs outside the party headquarters.

Tuan Wreh referring to the statement which Mrs Sirleaf made to the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas last July in Philadelphia and said that was made in her personal capacity, and not as a representative of LAP.

However, CIC Doe made it clear that he has no malice against any of those that were called to report the Mansion, and pointed that they are being detained "for safe keeping," because according to him, some of the soldiers could have gone to their houses and "kill you for promotion."

Dr Doe said while it is true that he is not a lawyer "to convict you," he would however, consult the INA to decide whether they should be tried by the Court or the Military Tribunal.

He noted that it is any of these judicial arms that would judge them guilty or not guilty, and inform Liberians and the international community about their fate.

/9312

CSO: 3400/356

LIBERIA

LAP SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE RANSACKED

Monrovia FOOTPRINTS TODAY in English 12 Nov 85 pp 1,2

[Text] The Secretary-General of the Liberia Action Party (LAP), Dr Byron Tarr walked into his office on Carey Street in Monrovia early yesterday morning only to find that the premises had been ransacked over the weekend by some unknown persons.

A visit by our reporter yesterday at Dr Tarr's office found the office in a helter-skelter disarray as papers, books and drawers were all tumbled in a heap on the floor.

According to Dr Tarr, the only thing missing was the sum of \$500 which he said, belonged to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Development Consultants which he heads.

He told our reporter that he was convinced that the act was "something calculated to find classified documents", noting that, "we don't keep documents here. The only documents we keep here are press releases which are not secret because they have already been made public."

He said, "this was no theft, because all our valuables were untouched", claiming that he suspected that the intention of the culprits was "politically motivated."

Dr Tarr noted that he had already informed the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the National Police who, according to him, is conducting an investigation into the matter.

/9312

CSO: 3400/357

LIBERIA

FINANCE MINISTER ON GOVERNMENT SALARY DELAYS

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 20 Nov 85 p8

[Text] The Minister of Finance Major G. Alvin Jones, has disclosed that salaries of employees of government ministries and agencies will be delayed by two months beginning December 1985.

He however said his ministry would continue the disbursement of October salary checks for government employees by the end of November, while November salary checks would be disbursed by January next year.

Minister Jones made the disclosure here yesterday at a news conference at the Finance Ministry.

He said the move was necessary to sustain the nation's economy as revenue collection in the country has dropped since the November 12 abortive invasion from \$500,000 to about \$100,000 daily.

The Finance Minister said prior to the November 12 incident, his ministry had started disbursing the October salary checks of government employees, but noted that as a result of the invasion, "revenue collection declined drastically and so salaries would be delayed".

Minister Jones said government would give priority to the military, paramilitary and other security agencies in disbursing salaries while second preference would be given to doctors and nurses in government employ.

Major Jones said while it was true that government employees were "hard hit" in the current austerity measure, his ministry was vigorously conducting a "rigid" tax collection exercise and urged real estate and transport owners to meet their obligations to government.

He said, if revenue collection improves in the not too distant future, government will give consideration to the payment of salaries on schedule."

/9312
CSO: 3400/357

LIBERIA

MINISTER TO PROPOSE ABOLITION OF LBS PAY CUTS

Monrovia FOOTPRINTS TODAY in English 26 Nov 85 pp 1,8

[Article by Joseph Toe]

[Text] In the wake of the 25 percent deduction across-the-board from the salaries of government employees, the Minister of Finance, Major G. Alvin Jones, says he intends to recommend to government the abolition of the remaining 25 percent salary cut for the new national radio station.

He noted that if the 25 percent salary deduction for the new radio station is maintained, employees within government ministries and agencies would be experiencing a total of 50 percent cut from their salaries in a particular month.

Minister Jones told a new conference at the Finance Ministry yesterday that had the November 12 invasion not occurred, his Ministry would have sought clarification from the Head of State to give advice for a specific month during which the balance 25 percent salary deduction for the radio station would have been made.

But he said "now that this has occurred" and the Head of State has announced the deduction of 25 percent from the salaries of those working in government ministries and agencies on a continuous basis, it would be appropriate that a portion of the deduction be allocated for the new national radio station.

"The time has not been specified when this will stop, but until the economy improves, so we will recommend that we carry on the 25 percent and part of it to be used for the radio station", Minister Jones emphasized.

Minister Jones pointed out that the 25 percent deduction which takes effect December 1, 1985, will be carried out on the gross salary of each civil servant, noting that after said amount is reduced, the withholding and other taxes levied would be calculated for subtraction and the remaining would be the individual's salary.

The Finance Minister made it clear that the recent action by the Head of State is not a result of international pressure, even though the Government of Liberia is "in default" with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Minister Jones explained that the pronouncement made by the Head of State is the result of the November 12 invasion which made the revenue of the government to drop, "maybe because of the confidence factor."

Prior to the invasion, he noted, government was collecting daily, an average revenue of \$500,000, but added that such amount has now reduced considerably to \$100,000.

He indicated that at the Roberts International Airport (RIA) where an amount of \$60,000 was being collected weekly, the Ministry of Finance has been able to collect said amount for the past 23 days.

Meanwhile, Minister Jones has said that the disbursement of government salaries for the month of October will not be completed until December, while November salaries will run to January and December salaries will be up to February, 1986.

He pointed out that government was contemplating on being current in its salary payment, but added that the recent development in the country has put everything backwards at a two-month deficit.

He said at the moment, government is giving priority to the security of this country, noting that if there should be any salary payments, the security which include the military and paramilitary would be given first consideration while doctors and nurses in government employ would be considered next.

Minister Jones noted that "we all have to now tighten our belts because the revenue trend has dropped and therefore we cannot guarantee that salaries will be current right now."

He then appealed to the various ministries and agencies of government to "submit to us" before the end of this month their payrolls for December so that the 25 percent deduction in salaries would be effected.

/9312

CSO: 3400/356

MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

RICE SHORTAGE PERSISTS--A serious rice shortage persists in Antananarivo Province. The situation is so bad in some areas that several local chiefs went this week to the presidential palace of Ambohitsirohitra with empty rice sacks; President Didier Ratsiraka refused to see them. The local press even reported that many mothers had been reduced to offering their children for sale in the markets because they were no longer able to feed them. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 6] /9274

BUSINESS DISPUTE JOBS POLICY--Madagascar's minister for the civil service, labor and social legislation, Georges Ruphin, has reassured foreign companies operating in the country with regard to increasing local employment content. In particular he guaranteed that his ministry would look favorably on any request for exemption from the ministerial directive of last 15 July which stated that any company taking on an expatriate employee would have to recruit a Malagasy national at the same time. The measure was considered by business circles not to conform to the liberal spirit of the investment code which was published a month earlier, and to make inevitable an increase in the size of a company payroll. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 7] /9274

CSO: 3400/364

MOZAMBIQUE

SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES INCREASE SUPPORT FOR MNR

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] The special services of the South African armed forces have resumed intensive aid for the guerrillas of the Mozambique National Resistance, while assistance from "private" interests in Saudi Arabia, West Germany, Portugal, South Africa and Pakistan appears to have ceased.

Mozambican president Samora Machel hoped he had dealt a fatal blow to the MNR when his forces, aided by several thousand Zimbabwean troops and with the logistic support of British military advisers, launched a large scale offensive against the rebel headquarters in the Gorongosa mountains at the end of August. But while the rebels lost their most important supply bases they were able to pull out most of their forces without major casualties.

Since then the MNR has stepped up its pressure around Maputo. In the past few weeks there have been many attacks on factories, hospitals and farms, as well as the capital's largest ammunition dump. The rebels have also carried out several kidnappings, the latest of which was on 14 November when 30 young men living in Matola, an industrial suburb of Maputo, were taken away by men disguised as government soldiers. The authorities immediately launched a massive search operation in Matola and the neighboring town of Machava, making 600 arrests.

The armed forces claim that numerous night flights of unidentified aircraft from the direction of South Africa have been taking place, and there seems little doubt that they have been to supply the guerrillas. Since the discovery at Gorongosa of documents clearly showing continued support for the MNR by Pretoria's armed forces and the direct involvement of deputy minister Louis Nel, it seems that the South African military no longer even try to hide their interventions. It is true that in recent months they have been able to reverse the trend completely and impose their viewpoint on the civilians in the government.

It seems probable that the South African high command managed to tip the balance definitively in its favor around the month of June. Since the beginning of the year negotiations between Pretoria and Maputo, strongly supported by Washington, had been trying to bring about South African military intervention in Mozambique against the MNR. A memorandum from the office of the president

of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, dated 4 February this year and recently published in the Belgian newspaper DE MORGEN, revealed that the United States deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Frank Wisner, who had just visited Maputo, suggested to Marshal Mobutu that Washington finance the transport and maintenance of a joint African force comprising Zairean and Moroccan troops to operate in Mozambique alongside South African and Maputo government troops.

Marshal Mobutu turned down the suggestion, but the operation was finally sunk by the point blank refusal of the South African military to participate. According to the notes found at Gorongosa, armed forces chief General Constand Viljoen threatened to resign if South Africans were sent into Mozambique on Maputo's side (see ION No 201). The South African intervention plan disclosed by MNR secretary-general Evo Fernandes in his 11 May interview with THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER (No 181) remained a dead letter. The military hierarchy has increased its influence in Pretoria and the war continues in Mozambique.

/9274

CSO: 3400/363

NAMIBIA

NOMINATION OF OVAMBO OFFICIAL WITHDRAWN

MB121445 Johannesburg SPA in English 1426 GMT 12 Dec 85

[Text] Windhoek, Dec 12, SAPA--The Kwanyama tribal authority has withdrawn its nomination of the chairman of the Ovambo administration, Mr Peter Kalangula, to the Ovambo Legislative Assembly, but state legal advisers said in Windhoek today the move would not unseat him.

"He can only lose his seat if he resigns, dies or if the administrator-general dissolves the Ovambo Legislative Assembly," a legal expert said.

Mr Kalangula, who heads the largest ethnic administration in SWA/Namibia, has come under increasing political pressure in the last weeks, particularly from members of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA].

Mr Kalangula was president of the DTA until a few years ago when he resigned from the Alliance.

He gave as reason for his resignation the DTA's commitment to [word indistinct] in the territory.

He has consistently rejected efforts to get him to join the process that led to the institution of the SWA/Namibian transitional government.

An urgent court application was due to be heard against him this week to declare invalid the Ovambo administration's budget of R128 million.

The budget was passed on July 1 by 31 members of Ovambo's Legislative Assembly.

By law, a quorum of 39 is required to approve legislation.

In terms of a last-minute out-of-court settlement, the administration's budget was suspended until Tuesday when the Ovambo Legislative Assembly will reconsider the budget.

Political sources in Windhoek said if Mr Kalangula again failed to convene a quorum next week, he could be asked to resign as chairman of the administration.

/8918
CSO: 3400/620

NAMIBIA

FORMER SWAPO INSURGENT GRANTED AMNESTY

MB121449 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1316 MGT 12 Dec 85

[Text] Windhoek, Dec 12, SAPA--A former SWAPO insurgent, Mr Martin Amakali, who surrendered to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA, has been granted amnesty in SWA/Namibia and was given R2000 at a ceremony in Windhoek today. Mr Amakali, 38, told a news conference afterwards he planned to join the army.

"I do not see any other place where I can protect myself," he said.

Mr Amakali was a member of SWAPO's Alpha Battalion and had been posted as a guard on the Kavango River.

On September 29 he crossed the river into Angola and surrendered to UNITA Armed forces from where he was taken to the operation headquarters of the SWA Territory force at Oshakati in northern SWA/Namibia.

Mr Amakali said he decided to make use of the SWA/Namibian transitional government's amnesty offer because he could see no reason for fighting "while peace talks were taking place."

Mr Amakali said since 1983 there had been tension within SWAPO between two factions.

One group wanted to lay down arms and join peace negotiations while the other group wanted to continue the armed struggle.

He alleged a senior SWAPO official in Lusaka, Mr Aaron Muschimba, had been "detained" by SWAPO some time ago, because he was leading the group who wanted to be involved in peace negotiations.

Mr Amakali left SWA/Namibia in 1974 and received military training in Zambia.

The cabinet chairman, Mr Hans Diergaardt, repeated the amnesty offer to SWAPO insurgents who wanted to lay down arms and to return to SWA/Namibia.

/8918

CSO: 3400/620

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

INDEPENDENCE TALKS MAY RESUME--The administrator-general of South-West Africa, Mr Louis Pienaar, says there are indications that international negotiations concerning independence for South-West Africa are to be resumed soon. Interviewed by Radio South-West Africa, Mr Pienaar said progress had been made over the past year with political parties setting out their demands clearly. Among the developments was the establishment of the government of national unity. He said the government's initiative to address the Security Council of the United Nations had been the expression of the interest of the internal parties.

[Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 13 Dec 85 MB] /8918

SIX CHILDREN KIDNAPPED BY SWAPO--The South-West Africa Territory Force has disclosed that SWAPO terrorists have kidnapped 6 Ovambo children about 10 km south of Etayi. The follow-up operation was conducted soon afterwards, but it was called off at the Angolan border. A spokesman says that six terrorists were involved in the kidnapping. He says that two of the children apparently managed to escape but they have not yet been traced. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 12 Dec 85 MB] /8918

CSO: 3400/620

NIGER

EFFORT TO SAVE DATE PALMS, GARDENS REPORTED

Niger LE SAHEL in French 24 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Souleymane Anza from a report by Mahamadou Mamoudou:
"Bilma--Saving the Palm Groves"]

[Text] In the Bilma district, 84,000 date palms and 650 gardens are dying. The project to combat sand in the Bilma palm groves is committed to the struggle to save them.

Bilma. In a region hostile to agriculture and livestock, the few palm groves that constitute a primary economic resource are being killed by the encroaching sands. This means that the district's 84,000 date palms that produce 1,680 metric tons of dates per year are in danger, as well as 650 gardens, cultivated by 440 families.

A solution to the problem seems to have been found: the project to combat sand in the Bilma palm groves. This effort has been made possible by Norwegian financial aid totalling approximately \$1,477,440 and a \$168,500 contribution from the government of Niger.

The project falls within the scope of the plan for action to combat desertification adopted by the United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1977. Its goal is to maintain and protect existing Bilma vegetation by taking special measures to ensure the reconditioning, upkeep and protection of the stripped land, as well as soil conservation and sand stabilization.

In the long term, the project hopes to improve living conditions in the Kaouar and the Djado and to establish a system for restoring and saving the region's palm groves.

The 5-year project was begun in 1984. In its first phase, it should bring about the protection and rehabilitation of eight district palm groves (Bilma, Chemidour, Aney, Dirkou, Aurrigui, Achenouma, Tehi Dorosso, and Fachi). According to project director Yahouza Salissou, this year's activities began in May, when a sensitization and training campaign was conducted among the people affected by the project.

After studying the first technical report, written in 1981, and carefully examining the palm groves, a project to plant five integrated kilometers of

windbreak to combat sand encroachment in the district seat was retained. To realize this plan, the project established a nursery measuring 256 meters along its periphery for the purpose of growing the approximately 12,000 seedlings needed. The plants are watered by a spring inside the nursery itself. In any case, water is not a problem in Bilma, which has a drilled well with a capacity of 300 to 400 cubic meters per hour.

For a survival program as vast as that of rehabilitating the palm groves, the Bilma project is limited for lack of means. This is why the project is focusing its first efforts on Bilma. Nonetheless, the project plans to pursue its objectives by increasing staff and equipment. The task is all the more worthwhile because its goal is the survival of the over 9,000 inhabitants whose principal activity is working the palm groves and the salt flats.

We should not forget that, along with gardening, salt sales represent an important source of income for the people of Bilma.

13014/12859

CSO: 3419/68

NIGER

BRIEFS

GRAIN FROM ITALY--A ceremony took place yesterday afternoon at the OPVN [Nigerien Foodstuffs Office], celebrating Italy's gift to Niger of 12,500 metric tons of grain. The gift consists of 5,000 metric tons of sorghum and 7,500 metric tons of rice. As of yesterday, 1,630 metric tons of sorghum and 7,038 metric tons of rice had been received. The rest is expected shortly. In his speech, Claudio Moreno, executive director of the Italian aid fund, declared that whenever the need arose, his government would stand by the people of Niger in their fight for self-sufficiency in food production. As representative of the Niger Armed Forces General Chief of Staff, Commander Salifou Tanko thanked the Italian government on the behalf of the people of Niger and gave his assurance that the grain would be distributed among the intended recipients. [Text] [Niamey LE SAHEL in French 23 Oct 85 p 2] 13014/12859

RICE FROM ITALY--Niger has just received 2,500 metric tons of rice in emergency aid from the Italian cooperative development agency. This emergency aid is part of Italy's Niger food aid program, under which Italy will also ship 1,100 metric tons of tomato paste, 320 metric tons of canned sardines and 90 metric tons of freeze-dried products. The Italian food aid program also provides for shipment in the very near future of a second grain allotment totaling 10,000 metric tons: 5,000 metric tons of rice and 5,000 metric tons of sorghum. [Text] [Niamey LE SAHEL in French 16 Oct 85 p 2] 13014/12859

CSO: 3419/68

NIGERIA

TROUBLE BREWING IN STATES, FOREIGN POLICY WAVERING

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 13 Nov 85 pp 4-5

[Text]

The Hausa-Fulani establishment, centred on the Sultan of Sokoto, is galvanising itself for a verbal war against Maj-Gen. **Ibrahim Babangida's** distinctly non-northern regime. The controversy over who is eligible for the succession to the Sultan (AC Vol 26 No 20) appears to have been resolved, at least temporarily. Sokoto-based opposition can now organise itself.

It will be recalled that **Shehu Malami**, a contender for the succession and a powerful former politician, claimed that nobody from the Buhari family was eligible to succeed, on grounds of invalid descent from the Dan Fodio family line. The Sokoto king-makers subsequently reprimanded Malami for his opinions about the Buhari family, and ordered him to apologise to the Buharis. As matters stand now, former head of state **Mohammed Buhari**, together with four others, is indeed a possible candidate for the Sultanate. Malami's *faux pas* was that he gave some comfort to Babangida's regime by expressing his views about the undesirability of Buhari, and said that Babangida's state of economic emergency should be supported.

An open admission that the northern establishment has lost its influence over national policy has been made in a statement published by **Junaid Mohammed**, a former member of the federal legislature. In an attack on Babangida's administration, disguised as an assessment of its performance after 50 days, he deplores the fact that there are only two Hausa-Fulani members of the ruling *Armed Forces Ruling Council* (AFRC). This is a radical departure from previous practice when "the north" was taken to mean the old Northern Region, including the minorities. By singling out the Hausa-Fulanis, Junaid identifies what used to be the "true" north - the ruling elite which only associated itself politically with the minorities to sustain its claim of numerical superiority over the rest of the country.

The minorities today have declared themselves independent from the old emirates. In place of the Kaduna Mafia there is now talk of the Langtang Mafia and the Bida old boys. Langtang, in Plateau state, is the home of several AFRC members, and Bida, in Niger State, produced a surprisingly large number of today's military leaders, including Babangida himself. Junaid's complaint, that the new government ignores federalism, because it does not contain representatives from Ondo or Bauchi states, is a contentious issue. Pressure groups from Ondo have indeed addressed petitions to Babangida, claiming neglect because they have no voice in the federal centre. Ondo has long been the focus of wider Yoruba trouble, particularly because of an old border dispute with Oyo. (A local chief recently complained about the blood split "within the past two months", implying there is both lawlessness and opposition to Babangida in this area).

The former governor of Ondo, Commodore **Bamidele Otiko**, was the only state governor whose redeployment was not announced. When Commander **Michael Akhigbe** took over as governor of Ondo, he found the state's finances to be "chaotic". He has yet to win popularity. Opposition to his administration is led by the influential market women, who went on strike in protest to the state's revenue collection policy, which used strong-arm methods against small business. As a result, armed protection had to be provided for local dignitaries. Ondo has been the only state without a brigade headquarters. Babangida has now ordered the 35th air defence artillery brigade to move to Akure.

There are similar disputes among states in other parts of Nigeria, notably between Cross River and Benue, where fighting erupted again last month, destroying the family home of Lt-Col. **John Inienger**, governor of Bendel state, who comes from one of the border villages.

Worry about the disturbances was reflected in an address to the armed forces by Babangida at the beginning of the month. He called for vigilance against internal subversion. Officers were asked to report unusual movements, faces and incidents. "You must expect that we have enemies who will not relent in their futile efforts to destabilise this nation". His stress on national unity and his refusal to accept religion as a political vehicle could be construed as an attempt to channel discontent towards traditional leaders. Certainly there is a good deal of unhappiness in the civil service, which has had its pay cut as an austerity measure, like the armed forces and the police. The *Nigerian Labour Congress* protests that it was not consulted in advance of the measure, unlike the armed forces,

which appear to have consented. Labour leaders have given the government until the end of the month to rescind the pay cuts. The AFRC, however, seems to discount the possibility of industrial action.

A hotter issue at present is the difference which has arisen between the AFRC and the foreign ministry over the conduct of foreign relations. The trouble was started by Nigeria's low profile at the Commonwealth conference in Nassau. Nigerian officials there lacked the experience to leak information to the press. When Nigeria's delegation leader, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, the chief of general staff, told a closed meeting that Nigeria might organise economic reprisals against Britain and others unwilling to bring pressure on Pretoria, his staff declined to let this be known. And Ukiwe himself misjudged domestic opinion when he agreed that his government might participate in the Commonwealth panel to be set up to arrange a dialogue with South Africa.

The foreign minister, Professor Bola Akinyemi, set the record straight a few days later at the UN with a tough speech on sanctions. When he returned to Lagos, he seems to have asked the AFRC for "clarification" in view of the high profile Babangida intended to adopt in world affairs. Soon afterwards he announced that Nigeria had no intention of taking part in the Commonwealth panel. Instead it would organise support for the tougher sanctions that

would be considered by the Commonwealth if South Africa did not retreat on apartheid within six months. To underline his attitude, Akinyemi cancelled an interview he was to have given to Mrs Tutu-Seavers, the US-domiciled daughter of Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was in Nigeria on business. She refused to underwrite Nigeria's policy on economic sanctions. Moreover, she expressed her belief in a peaceful rather than a violent solution in South Africa. Akinyemi's snub presumably was intended to show Nigerian support for the ANC.

Nigeria's ambivalent stance on South Africa was recently illustrated when a contract was given to the French company *Spie Batignolles* for the construction of the fourth oil refinery, despite the publishing in Lagos of detailed information about the company's South African business. However, Akinyemi and the Generals agree that France is more sympathetic to Nigeria than Britain. The French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, who visited Nigeria this month, promised to support the country's case as a credit-worthy nation which is not dramatically

indebted in terms of its population and potential - a view which contrasts sharply with the British government's. Import licences might well be awarded preferentially for purchases in countries which are major customers for Nigerian oil. That would certainly favour France.

/12828

CSO: 3400/607

NIGERIA

DAVID-WEST'S PERFORMANCE AS OIL MINISTER CRITICIZED

London TALKING DRUMS in English 25 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Maigani in "Whispering Drums": "The Stewardship of David-West"]

[Text] "To be successful, a man needs friends.
To be very successful, a man needs
enemies..."

"God defend me from my friends.
As for my enemies, I know how to take
care of them..." (*Wenninist apoptheoms*)

Three weeks before they were sacked from the high citadel of power, the cantankerous trio of Buhari, Idiagbon and Rafindadi had prepared a surprise package to be released to all Nigerians on, or before, the country's Silver Jubilee Anniversary, on October 1, 1985. The package contained, among other things, the regime's first and major cabinet reshuffle. But the attempt was more than a reshuffle because six ministers were going to be sacked and eleven top military officers including three generals and four governors were going to be retired from the Nigerian Army. But as good fortune would have it, the package never saw daylight and before the gigantic trio knew it, their plan had boomeranged. They were themselves sacked and relieved from their posts with ignominy and their stewardship buried into the bottomless ash-heap of history.

Among those on the hit-list was Professor Tam David-West, Buhari's Oil Minister then, and, thanks to Sani Abacha, still is. Since this event, a lot of water has passed under the bridge which is why I have found it necessary to discuss the stewardship of David-West as Nigeria's Oil Minister from Buhari to Babangida. Prompting this analysis are two things: the first is the place of the oil industry in

Nigeria's economy, while the second has to do with recent events in the country's oil ministry and even beyond.

To say that oil has, since the seventies, been the live-wire of Nigeria is to make a trite statement indeed. First discovered in commercial quantities in 1956 by Shell-BP in what is now Rivers State, Nigeria's first commercial shipment of crude oil was made in February 1958, with a production level running at about 5,000 barrels a day (in monetary terms, Nigeria, I am sure, got less than £3000 for those barrels). But some 20 years later, Nigeria was deriving from the sale of its oil alone, a revenue put at some 21 billion naira (N21 billion) annually, providing some 85 per cent of federal revenues and 30 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The pivotal role oil has come to play in the country's economic development was demonstrated in 1978 when the government's poor crude pricing policy led to a slump in production, a drastic decline in federal revenue and foreign exchange, and an economy in recession. This pivotal role has also manifested itself in the number of gigantic projects and development plans spewed all over the country.

And yet the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the organisation responsible for marketing most of Nigeria's oil as well as mounting its own exploration and production ventures, has never been the most dynamic of organisations. The NNPC's weaknesses came to light when ex-President Shehu Shagari appointed a five-man investigation team to look into the

'oil-gate' scandal of 1980. In the published report, the tribunal castigated the NNPC at length and said that the NNPC had no "efficient management structure, had a glaring absence of supervisory staff at all levels and that there has always been serious friction between the chief executive and the board," (the chief executive then was Festus Marinho). Most strongly criticised was the NNPC's accounts department which was described as a "shambles which had not kept or published accounts for the previous five years..."

Perhaps it was with a view to minimizing the damage done to the NNPC that the Shagari administration decided to have the NNPC come directly under the President, with Yahaya Dikko (a staunch Shagari loyalist) manning the ministry and advising the President on a day to day basis. This bold move, along with the credibility and discipline of Yahaya Dikko (he is still respected among international oil dealers as a disciplined person for resisting the temptations of personal enrichment) helped to instill some measure of confidence in the NNPC. But this confidence was short-lived when Buhari came onto the scene and re-appointed Festus Marinho as the Chief Executive of NNPC. Tam David-West for only a brief period became an onlooker while Marinho and Buhari dictated the pulse of Nigeria's oil industry.

The serious friction that had existed between Marinho and members of the NNPC board re-surfaced and David-West was engulfed in it. Anybody with principles would have resigned, but in African politics, the adage is "if you can't beat them, join them," so David-West callously joined the gang into the countertrade and counterfraud negotiations and many other questionable deals, bartering the country's oil for cheap and perishable commodities.

At international oil seminars and at OPEC meetings, David-West stands in for Nigeria. Lacking in diplomacy, arrogant and haughty at times and unserious, the oil minister's performances at these meetings have always been disastrous. More so, with the unholy alliance contracted between David-West and an American, Carl Bunnett of Mobil, Nigeria's position concerning oil prices, production quotas or limits are no longer kept secret. In fact, word from the grapevine has it that it is Carl Bunnett who prepares memos and drafts for David-West to read at OPEC meetings and to present to the President. Sources also disclose that it was this discovery by Buhari that was to have led to David-West's termination of appointment. It is for these reasons and many more that a lot of people who are in the know wonder why David-West was re-appointed Minister for Petroleum Affairs by the Babangida regime at all.

Whether it is because Babangida was able to discover the "real David-West" (which is baloney), or whether it was because of pressure from friends (which seems likely), there is one fact the President must take into consideration. Oil is all that Nigeria has got now. If the country is going to recover from its dreadful economic state, the President cannot afford to play with the country's one and only asset. The NNPC must come under the direct personal supervision and control of the President and a person of independent intellect must be brought in to take charge of the oil ministry. David-West has been less than successful in this task and his continued presence is embarrassing.

Somebody up there must be brave enough to tell him that enough is enough, his close friendship and personal relationships with those that matter notwithstanding.

/13046

CSO: 3400/637

SOMALIA

SSDF TROOPS GIVE ULTIMATUM

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 6

[Text]

The military commanders of the armed opposition Somali Salvation Democratic Front confronted the organisation's new chairman, Mohamed ABSHIR, with a five-point ultimatum when he visited them last October 16 under Ethiopian escort in the two Somali communities of Balambale and Galdogob, which the SSDF claims to have "liberated" but which have been in Ethiopian hands since June 1982. The SSDF rank and file refused to let Mr ABSHIR into their camps, so he had to talk to their chiefs in an Ethiopian camp. The five demands were:

- The release of former SSDF president Abdullahi YUSSUF and the 20 other front members imprisoned by the Ethiopians;
- Clarification of the circumstances in which four SSDF members were killed in Dire Dawa last month;
- The trial of those responsible for their murder;
- An end to Ethiopian interference in the SSDF's internal affairs;
- The calling of a special SSDF congress.

Furthermore, from an SSDF source it is learned that Mr ABSHIR held a meeting in Addis Ababa on November 9 with representatives of the Ethiopian government and a Libyan delegation. The only item on the agenda was the SSDF's present crisis, in particular how to calm the front's guerrilla fighters, who have reportedly been in open rebellion since Mr YUSSUF's arrest. According to our sources they are ready to attack the Ethiopians, in spite of their total inferiority, and then if necessary to go over to the Somali government. This would spell the end of the SSDF.

According to the same sources, the five new leaders of the SSDF installed by the Ethiopians are all pro-Western. Apart from Mr ABSHIR, they are Hassan ALI Mire, a former Somali education minister trained in the United States, Ahmed DAHIR Hassan, a former director-general in the civilian era, Muse ISLAN, former Somali ambassador to Kuwait and Sudan, and Hersi BULAN Farah, a former minister who is a fervent Moslem and strongly pro-West.

/9274
CSO: 3400/358

SOMALIA

BRIEFS

SNM STATEMENT--Following publication of an article in ION No 205 on the strategy of the Ethiopian intelligence services towards the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and the Somali National Movement, the SNM's London bureau has asked us to state that this organization categorically rejects any idea of the secession of northern Somalia, stating that the people of the north have been "in the vanguard of the Somali republic's unity." [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 6] /9274

CSO: 3400/358

SWAZILAND

BRIEFS

STRAY ROCKETS AT BORDER--Mbabane--Swazi customs officials and their families in the village of Lomahasha on the Swazi-Mozambique border are threatening to leave their jobs and homes unless the government takes action to protect them against stray rockets, shells and bullets fired during frequent armed skirmishes on the Mozambique side of the border. In the latest incident a bazooka rocket landed among the Swazi officials' houses but failed to explode. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 25 Nov 85 p 12] /9274

DOCTORS PROTEST--Doctors in Swazi government hospitals and clinics have begun a work-to-rule in protest against the non-payment of agreed over-time allowances. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 28 Nov 85 p 5] /9274

CSO: 3400/362

ZIMBABWE

DANES LAUNCH NEW PROJECTS IN RURAL AREAS

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 1 Dec 85 p C1

[Text] The Danish International Aid Organisation, Danida, has set aside about \$2,5 million for the rehabilitation of handpumps and improvement of sanitation in the rural areas.

The projects, which were established by both Danida and Unicef, will cover the 25 centres which have been established throughout the country.

A veterinary service has also been established with the help of the Department of Veterinary Services to help small-scale farmers. The Danish counsellor, Mr Henning Frotlund, said this was designed to help the farmers in animal management.

"The idea is to have an advisory service for the small-scale farmers in every province, which is necessary for their animal management scheme," he said.

Last year the organisation spent about \$1,5 million on the establishment of the centres. One such programme is at Nvava. He was pleased with the developments taking place there.

At discussions held last week between the organisation and the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Denmark will provide a loan of about \$21 million as part of its development co-operation programme. The loan will be interest-free.

The loan is a continuation of Danish support for Zimbabwe's grain storage programme. A master plan and a 10-year investment plan has already been worked out by a Danish consultancy firm.

Since independence Denmark has given assistance both as grants and interest-free development credits. There is a possibility that the soft loan and the grant assistance would be combined in the case of the grain storage programme.

"Other planned areas of Danish support are in the field of agricultural education within the sector of agricultural institutes, as well as a project of small-scale irrigation systems in communal areas and resettlement areas.

"The initial inventory of such systems will be funded by us and made by a Zimbabwean firm," he said.

Denmark is also giving support through the EEC programme and the regional SADCC co-operation. One such programme is the Animal Disease Reference Laboratory in Harare which will cost \$4 million.

Last week the Danish embassy launched three 36-tonne boats at Kariba which will be used to ferry essential supplies, agricultural produce and health supplies for people in the remotest areas along the Zambezi River.

The boats were assembled by a local company with the help of Danish experts. They cost \$2 million. Mr Frotlund said they were starting up a training programme for the DDF so local staff could operate and service the boats when the Danish staff leave.

/12828

CSO: 3400/608

ZIMBABWE

NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN SOVIET UNION INCREASING

Harare THE HERALD in English 29 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] "The number of students from Zimbabwe grows from year to year in Soviet colleges and universities. Seventy-three have come this year alone," says Cde Yuri Kozhaev, department head at the USSR Ministry of Higher and Special Education.

The number of students from Zimbabwe, now exceeding 300, is still a tiny percentage of the 110000-strong foreign student population in the USSR. The Soviet Union hosted its first Third World students in the fifties, so that many newly independent countries had a chance to appreciate its aid.

More than 200000 people from some 150 countries became diplomatic specialists in the USSR, Cde Kozhaev explains.

"Importantly, the Soviet Union educates Third World specialists in branches crucial for their countries," he said.

DEGREES

Five out of the 73 Zimbabwean freshmen--Joshua Mashamba, Evans Myududu, Clifford Mauyeza, Abigan Manwadi, and the girl Fiona Musvosvi--will become engineers. In six years, they will receive degrees in electronics and several other trades, among them railway exploitation.

Medicine comes second in popularity after engineering, and a number of Zimbabwean students will become doctors, among them Didymus Ngorara, Moses Gondo and Trevor Ndanga.

This does not imply that only engineers and doctors are trained in the Soviet Union. Many young Zimbabweans study pedagogics, law and journalism.

There are foreign students in 600 colleges and universities all over the Soviet Union. Those from Zimbabwe study in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Kharkov, Voigograd, Odessa, Voronezh, Ivanovo and elsewhere.

In Moscow alone, they are to be met at Moscow University, Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, the Veterinary

Academy, Geological Prospecting Institute, Power Industry Institute and the Institute of Geodesics and Cartography.

ESSENTIAL

Cde Yuri Kozhaev stresses another essential detail. With the temperatures in Moscow now about zero centigrade, the only slightly warmer in the southern parts of the country, the Zimbabweans still manage, with all the warm clothing given free.

As teaching in the Soviet Union is in Russian, foreigners undergo a year's preparatory course with the main emphasis on language and revision of the instruction they received at school.

Then five years of professional training comes, with much attention to the conditions of the countries they come from. Agricultural colleges and academics, for instance, have special courses in tropical agriculture.

Foreign students in the Soviet Union are just as athletic, sociable and socially active as their Soviet peers. They use sporting facilities, libraries, cultural centres and other facilities on equal footing with everybody, and again free.

/12828

CSO: 3400/608

ZIMBABWE

UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE VICE-CHANCELLOR ON SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English 1 Dec 85 p C1

[Text] The recent South-South conference held in Harare further strengthened the efforts and resolve of Third World universities to shape the destiny of their countries.

"The theme of this conference struck a responsive chord in our circles. It was only last year that representatives of several universities in this region met here to discuss ways in which greater co-operation could be achieved, ways in which we could achieve the effective and efficient use of scarce resources, ways in which dependence on vertical North-South academic linkages could be reduced, ways in which self-reliance in science and technology and other fields could be promoted." University of Zimbabwe Vice-Chancellor, Professor Walter Kamba said last week.

"We believed then and we believe now that such co-operation could only advance the cause of unity in Africa, but could also enhance the role the universities must play in promoting co-operation among and between themselves for the benefit of their countries."

CO-SPONSORED

The University of Zimbabwe and the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies co-sponsored the five-day South-South conference which brought together scholars for a discussion on the past experiences, current contexts and future prospects for South-South co-operation.

The conference was chaired by Zimbabwe's Finance, Economic Planning and Development Minister, Dr Bernard Chidzero. An 18-page communique was released at the end of the conference, and there is a section that deals with the role of universities and research institutions in South-South co-operation.

Professor Kamba said the work of the University of Zimbabwe as a developmental institution had been particularly enhanced by the deliberations, recommendations, the research agenda and research implications that had emerged as a result of the South-South conference.

"The University of Zimbabwe has a strong conviction that South-South co-operation is a cardinal, nay, an indispensable ingredient in the overall

development of the Third World, but perhaps more importantly the University's active involvement and participation (at the recent conference) stems from a firm belief and recognition of the role universities are expected to play and must play, not only in development, but also in the forging of trans-national links that are so critical to South-South co-operation."

The South-South conference was convened in the context of the continuing dominance of the North in all economic spheres, and its objective was to stimulate forms of co-operation within the South, which would decrease dependence on the North, the reference point being the South's success in altering the North-South relationship of its advantage.

Professor Kamba said South-South co-operation among universities had increased in the last few years and that in Africa there had been significant development in this direction, including the formation of the Association of Eastern and Southern African Universities in the past two years.

During the conference, said Professor Kamba, there was agreement that the universities and research institutions of the South constituted one of its most potent resources for the elimination of skill shortages, the development of required technologies and the advancement of its scientific capabilities.

"It was also recognised that universities in particular have a catalytic role in the definition of means and ends for South-South co-operation. There was also however, the sense that the potential of the universities to further the objectives of South-South co-operation had not been fully realised and that further investments in this area would serve to retain the intellectual capital and augment the scientific capacity of the South.

"Such investments require more rigorous rationalisations and the division of disciplinary and applied specialism on a regional basis. Linkages between universities and their environing societies also need to be improved."

The universities themselves needed to consider new and non-traditional techniques of teaching and the communication of research findings, including the provision of mobile short-term training schemes which use the expertise and facilities of more than one university.

It had also been agreed at the conference that the societies of the South should make clear their expectations for university service along those lines and correspondingly supply the resources necessary for such collaborative ventures.

Professor Kamba said the conference had recommended the establishment of a working group to examine the enhancement of the ability of universities to contribute to South-South co-operation.

"The conference recognised the need for technical and policy research support for the South to carry out urgent tasks such as preparing position and strategy papers and articulating proposals and positions of the South.

"Monitoring of developments having a bearing on North-South issues and North-South co-operation and undertaking of research and studies of these purposes also need to be undertaken."

The conference was also of the view that as a step toward establishing an effective organisation of developing countries, a technical research and support unit should be established as early as possible, and the Third World Foundation, within the resources available to it, would take necessary steps in this regard.

The unit would maintain contact and undertake collaborative research and technical work with appropriate institutions--international, regional, sub-regional and national, including universities and research institutions. The agreement was that this unit should be entrusted with the technical preparatory work for the other meetings scheduled for 1986, including South-South II.

The conference, he explained, had provided a valuable forum for a frank and in-depth exchange of experiences relating to South-South co-operation and the evaluation of its prospects, for a formulation of new approaches aimed at overcoming obstacles which had hitherto impeded progress, and for a re-dedication to the principles of collective self-reliance relevant to the promotion of South-South co-operation, not only in the African region, but on a global scale.

SHORT-SIGHTED

Universities in practically every country of the South formed a potential asset in the task of South-South co-operation that would be unwise to overlook. There were a number of reasons why it would be short-sighted to leave out the universities in any scheme for scientific and technology co-operation in the South.

"First, and despite the mechanisms described above which have drawn away much of our scientific and technology talent from the universities and placed it in specialised research agencies, the fact remains that the universities of the South retain much of the best professional scientific talent within their respective societies.

"The reasons for these are complex, and draw considerably on nonpecuniary factors in job satisfaction. Another reason why the universities cannot be left out of any successful consideration of the issue of South-South scientific and technological co-operation lies in the fact that when this is attempted exclusively on the basis of co-operation between agencies the results are often fragmented.

"Third, the universities cannot be omitted in this quest for South-South co-operation in scientific and technological co-operation for the obvious but often overlooked fact that they are the primary source of the expertise upon which it depends. Research scientists must be trained, and much of their specialist training can be provided in the research institute which draws on their skills.

"But the sub-strata of this training are today, ubiquitously, provided by the universities and it would be short-sighted in the extreme for the societies of the South to continue to depend on the North for the provision of this basic training. To do so would be to perpetuate, at a most fundamental level, the scientific and technological dependency from which we seek to escape by our co-operation," the University of Zimbabwe Vice-Chancellor explained.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SABC COMMENTARY CRITICIZES HARARE DECLARATION

MB120547 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Dec 85

[Station commentary: "The Harare Declaration"]

[Text] The extraordinarily close association between churches expounding the so-called liberation theology and those organisations working for the overthrow of the present dispensation in this country has emerged very clearly from last week's emergency meeting on South Africa convened by the World Council of Churches in Harare.

From the resolutions of the three-day meeting--among them that the international community impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, and that the churches support the ANC and the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] in prayer--it is equally clear that they are striving for a common goal. Hardly any effort is made any more to mask this common interest: The meeting was convened at the request of Dr Beyers Naude, general-secretary of the South African Council of Churches [SACC], who was banned for seven years from 1977 in terms of internal security legislation.

It was also attended by the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Bishop Desmond Tutu, who wasted no time in meeting with top-level representatives of various terrorist organisations.

In a statement issued during the conference, the ANC--whose declared aim is the revolutionary transformation of South Africa into a socialist state--boasted of its first three presidents all being clergymen. It is indeed a strange simbiosis between churches, which have no mandate to preach violence, and communist organisations, which have no compunction in murdering innocents in order to further their political aims.

And there can be no doubt about communist control of the ANC. Nineteen of the 36 members of its Central Committee are also members of the South African Communist Party. Experience in other parts of the world has demonstrated that the churches in fact are the first to suffer following a communist take over.

The extent to which the South African Council of Churches has strayed from its calling to promote the spreading of the gospel is well known. According to the council's own financial statements in 1984, it spent only one percent of its four-and-a-half-million rand income--96 percent of which came from overseas sources--on evangelism. Two-million rand, however, was allocated to so-called "victims of apartheid."

The Eloff commission, which for two years investigated the activities of the SACC, discovered that the council had developed into an organisation involved in political, social and economic issues. It acted as a political pressure group, and the commission referred to numerous "strategies of resistance" adopted by the SACC to promote the aims of a black liberation struggle.

These included an extensive propaganda campaign to persuade foreign governments to exert political, economic and diplomatic pressure on South Africa, attempts to discredit the state and its institutions, such as the defence force and the police, a civil disobedience campaign, support for avoiding national service, and the endorsing of disinvestment.

Financial support was also given to trade unions involved in labour disputes, and to black consciousness groups for protest action. These activities are hardly reconcilable with those of a church organisation. The SACC claims that it represents 15-million Christians—more than 80 percent of them blacks—in this country. The time has surely come for ordinary members, whose churches are affiliated to the SACC, to ask themselves seriously whether they want to be part of an organisation which conspicuously collaborates with terrorists and Communists.

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CSO: 3400/646

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY DISCUSSES SOVIET THREAT FROM ANGOLA

MB170704 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 17 Dec 85

[Station Commentary]

[Text] The mustering of Angolan Government forces and Cubans for yet another attack against the UNITA resistance movement has implications reaching far wider than the borders of Angola. This conflict has its origin in the involvement of the superpower which does not hesitate to use armed forces in its expansionist drive and regards Angola as a strategic springboard for the subjugation of southern Africa.

After suffering a humiliating defeat 2 months ago in their previous assault on Dr Jonas Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba in southeastern Angola, the MPLA forces, supported by Cuban soldiers and directed by Soviet advisers, are engaged in another determined effort to wipe out UNITA. Soviet bombers and sophisticated helicopter gunships have already started softening up UNITA positions, while about five brigades of the Angolan Army numbering about 5,000 men and 2 Cuban regiments of between 2,000 and 3,000 men are lined up on two battlefronts. At the same time a massive airlift is in progress to supply the communist assault force. Since October, almost 600 flights have been undertaken to ferry military supplies from the forts of Luanda and Lobito to the front.

The enormous scope of Soviet involvement is also evident from the fact that as estimated 2,000 million rands worth of arms, including advanced MIG-23 aircraft, have been supplied to Angola. There are also about 1,200 Soviet advisers in the country, while air attacks against UNITA are carried out mainly by Soviet and East German fighter pilots. But the chief instrument of the Soviet thrust into this subcontinent remains its Cuban surrogate force consisting of about 27,000 combat troops with between 7,000 and 8,000 more in advisory or military training roles.

In sharp contrast to this undisguised Soviet support for a government kept in power solely by the Cuban presence, the United States has done little more than talks about assistance for the pro-Western UNITA movement. With the advent of the rainy season in Angola, UNITA will be subjected mainly to air attack, and Dr Savimbi has directed an urgent appeal to the United States for antiaircraft and antitank missiles. At one stage, there were talks about 700 million rands worth of covert military aid for UNITA, but now the

United States has decided that from next month, only about 95 million rands worth of aid will be made available which can rightly be termed too little, too late. It would be naive of South Africa to believe that should this latest offensive against UNITA succeed, the Cubans will meekly troop out of Angola. Rather, it would free them to take on first South-West Africa, then possibly Botswana, and ultimately South Africa herself.

It is for this reason that South Africa acknowledged earlier this year that she was giving material, humanitarian, and moral support to UNITA, and declared by way of her minister of defense, General Magnus Malan, that this assistance would be continued until the Cubans were out of Angola.

While the United States and the West in general remains obsessed with misguided political and economic pressure on South Africa, it would seem that they are blind to the threatening Soviet expansionism from Angola, and the Soviet surrogate forces there are not only preventing South-West Angola from becoming independent, but also constitute a threat to the freedom of the entire sub-continent. There is no way that South Africa can afford to close her eyes to this threat even if she stands alone against it.

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CSO: 3400/646

SOUTH AFRICA

DEPUTY MINISTER ON CAHORA BASSA, COMMONWEALTH GROUP

MB131107 Johannesburg Television Service in English 1800 GMT 12 Dec 85

[Interview with South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ron Miller by Pat Rogers with an introductory feature on Cahora Bassa by correspondent Douglas McClure including interviews with Mozambique Security Minister Sergio Vieira and Electricity Supply Commission Chief Executive Ian MacRae on the "Network" program introduced by Donna Doig--live]

[Text] [Doig] The building of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme represented an historic agreement between South Africa and its neighboring countries, but today it stands as a monument to a dream gone wrong. Pat Rogers will be talking to deputy minister of foreign affairs about the destabilization in this region. But first this report:

[Correspondent Douglas McClure] Cahora Bassa, the most ambitious hydroelectric scheme on the African Government, some say even in the world. It all began as a dream and was hailed as a monument to interstate cooperation in southern Africa. The dam has the capacity to produce enough electricity to satisfy 8 percent of South Africa's requirements or the total combined needs of Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland, Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Kenya. The 270 km long dam, the sixth largest in the world, could also provide endless possibilities for the development of commercial fishing, angling, water sports, and tourism. Today that dream has been shattered. After a decade of sabotage, this monument to international cooperation and prosperity lies as one of Africa's great white elephants.

The positive and negative poles conveying the direct current from Cahora Bassa flow to South Africa through two powerlines, each about 1 km apart. Nine hundred km of the 1,400 km line ran through Mozambique, much of it through territory dominated by Renamo, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, who continuously block up the pylons. The lines end at the Apollo substation north of Pretoria where the direct current is converted to usable alternating current. Today the converter station is largely inactive. Ironically, the Frelimo government of Mozambique has had to contend with the dissidents since their accession to power in 1974, the same year the dam was completed. Without direct military involvement, South Africa has assisted the Mozambique Government in securing the vulnerable power lines.

[Sergio Vieira] In the case of Mozambique, we are putting forces, equipment--military equipment--ammunition, etc. South Africa is supplying for those forces some combat rations, is supplying some tents, has supplied some vehicles for the patrol and to take the (?goods) of maintenance and so on....

[McClure, interrupting] But no soldiers.

[Vieira] No soldiers, no military equipment.

[McClure] In spite of this, power lines and pylons are today being blown up so regularly and the security situation in rural Mozambique has so deteriorated that replacing the 520 pylons is becoming virtually impossible. Repair costs to date are estimated at around 30 million rands. Recent headlines suggest that Escom [Electric Supply Commission] is writing off power from Cahora Bassa. Here chief executive, Ian MacRae:

[MacRae] No, not at all. Escom is certainly not writing off Cahora Bassa, notwithstanding the fact that we have not received power from Cahora Bassa for a while. But no certainly. Escom like HCB [Hydroelectric of Cabora Bassa], the power supply company set up by Portugal and Mozambique to operate Cahora Bassa, no we will continue with our efforts to try to regain supply from Cahora Bassa.

[McClure] So when did we last receive power from Cahora Bassa?

[MacRae] The last meaningful power that we received from Cahora Bassa was in 1983. That happened to be during the draft year and we received power during the period from about June 1983 to October.

[MacRae continues] It was much useful at that time because we were having to cut capacity on certain of our power station due to shortage of water.

[McClure] Today the project of the century stands in Mozambique, hopelessly underutilized. The station itself is maintained in perfect condition, but its turbines produce only 10 percent of their potential output. According to a statement by Escom last year, Cahora Bassa power had the effect of stabilizing the loading on South Africa's grid system. So how dependent are we on the scheme?

[MacRae] At that time I think (?when) we made that statement before, we were certainly going through a period of high demand, high growth rates, and certainly our system was being stretched, and power supply from Cahora Bassa would greatly assist us. Today, that situation has altered a little in that with the turndown on the economic situation, also our demand is down a little, we also of course have commissioned additional plants, and therefore our system at the moment is very stable without Cahora Bassa.

[McClure] They say that hindsight is perfect with 20-20 vision. But with the benefit of hindsight, do you not believe it was a little shortsighted to get involved in a scheme as vulnerable as Cahora Bassa?

[MacRae] No, not at all. I do not subscribe to that thought. I believe southern Africa has great potential for the development of the resources and the people within the country, and I think there is no better way than to establish a power grid in southern Africa which would enable the countries to cooperate together in this whole development. This also makes schemes viable, and I think Cahora Bassa was just a start of what we believe would have been a great and magnificent power grid for the future, and I still hold that same dream and believe that that will still come to fruition some time in the future.

[McClure] The fact nevertheless remains. Instead of 2,000 megawatts humming down the 1,400 km powerline to the Transvaal, the sabotage teams of the MNR have turned a potential power house into a useless monument to factional power seeking. In so doing they are destroying a heritage, a future, and a dream.

[Rogers] Mr Ron Miller, Cahora Bassa, I think, was central to the Nkomati Accord. Does the South African Government now no longer taking electricity from that source not further undermine the Nkomati Accord?

[Miller] No, not entirely. The Cahora Bassa agreement was one of the first positive spin-offs of the Nkomati Accord which made it possible for Mozambique and South Africa to interact economically, but you know I must stress the fact that it was only one of the economic projects which were launched and made possible by the Nkomati Accord.

[Rogers] Would it not have had a better chance of working if South Africa perhaps had undertaken--and I do not know if the Mozambicans even asked for this--but if they had undertaken to provide military assistance to stop the Renamo guerrillas doing this kind of damage?

[Miller] Well, you know the South African Government's attitude is very clear on this. We are not prepared to use our military forces outside the borders of South Africa in the interest of struggle which is occurring in another country. So I am pretty certain that the South African Government would never had agreed to get involved there, irrespective of the fact that we were the consumers of that electricity....

[Rogers, interrupting] But, would....

[Miller, interrupting] As you heard earlier on in the program, we were prepared to give civil assistance to protect that line from Cahora Bassa.

[Rogers] Yes, and when it comes to military assistance and the attitude you mention, would it be true to say that attitude would be influenced by the fact that the Mozambican Government on the one hand is communist, and the Renamo guerrillas on the other hand, anticommunist?

[Miller] No. Irrespective of the ideological struggle which is going on in a neighboring country, South Africa is very particular about the principle that we are not going to get involved militarily in a neighbor's squabble, irrespective of which ideologicals [as heard] are clashing one (?with) the other there.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, could not that principle be questioned if one looks on the one hand at admitted violations, however technical, of the Nkomati Accord on the one hand, and relief to UNITA in Angola on the other hand?

[Miller] Well, I think first of all one has to examine the validity of the accusations which are made against South Africa. You know very few of those accusations which were included in the Gorongosa diaries have actually been proven beyond doubt, and our journals have indicated to the state president who has made it public that we were not providing military aid to Renamo after the Cahora Bassa and Nkomati Accords were signed. We did provide them with military aid before that, but after Nkomati, we discontinued that. So you know, it is unfair to say South Africa became party to the struggle between Frelimo and Renamo.

[Rogers] No, but I think that your government did admit, did it not, that there had been violations as I think they put it, of a technical nature.

[Miller] Yes, of a technical nature. The violations which are referred to refer to flights which were taken into Mozambique without advising the Frelimo government. In that sense, they were technical infringements, yes. But I would like to point out that the reason why these flights and other activities were undertaken was to try and encourage the spirit of Nkomati, which included a request to the South African Government to try to bring together Renamo and Frelimo around the negotiating table in order to bring about peace in Mozambique which incidentally would have made it possible then for us to use Cahora Bassa electricity. It is the military struggle which has caused the collapse of Cahora Bassa as a source of supply for South African electricity.

[Rogers] Yes, but could we, could we not have provided perhaps the sort of assistance that I think we have provided to UNITA in Angola that might have helped at least?

[Miller] Well the assistance we are giving to UNITA in Angola is humanitarian and material, and we are doing exactly the same for the Frelimo government in Mozambique. We even offered to provide, and I think we did provide, some equipment and tents and material for a civilian force to secure the line from Cahora Bassa. We do exactly the same on both sides of the border--Angola and Mozambique.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, how important to South Africa was Cahora Bassa? In fact, I think it accounted at its best and potentially for less than 10 percent of our power requirements altogether.

[Miller] Yes, I think Cahora Bassa (and) the 10 percent supply which was available to us at the time was not terribly important in terms of electrical supply immediately, but I think the political and long-term economic benefits were quite considerable. You know it was stated earlier on in this program by Mr MacRae that we were looking at a regional southern Africa grid of power, and that would have been to everybody's benefit in the long term, and Cahora Bassa represented a very tangible start in that cooperation between states of southern Africa, and I think if the ... [changes thought] once the civil war settles down in Mozambique, we can restart that potential inherent in Cahora Bassa.

[Rogers] Would the prospects for that kind of regional cooperation that you mention at the time that Cahora Bassa was built and devised and brought into reality--that is in the 1970's--was that prospect greater than it is now? That would be a sad reflection.

[Miller] No, I think the potential is still equally great between the 1970's and the 1980's. Perhaps it is more critical at the moment, because you know Mozambique is in a very strong downward swing in its economy, and they desperately require the sale of the Cahora Bassa Electricity to us because they require the foreign exchange. I may mention that the partner which is taking the greatest financial rap at the moment on the collapse of Cahora Bassa is, in fact, the Portuguese Government. The Portuguese Government I believe is losing something like 1 million rand a day in interest payments on the Cahora Bassa scheme. So I think if we look at the realities of southern Africa development, the potential is as great today as it was in the 1970's.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, if we could move on now from Cahora Bassa to London where today was held the first meeting of the commonwealth wise men on South Africa. Have you had any feedback at all on that meeting?

[Miller] Well, let me just say that of course it is not only wise men, there is a wise woman included there as well. So perhaps we can call them wise people. No, we are waiting to see what comes out of that 3-day conference. We have no idea what they are discussing at the moment, and the South African attitude remains the same as is reflected in the statement made by the minister of foreign affairs, Minister Pik Botha, when he said that if the intention of this group is to come to South Africa to discover firsthand what is happening in South Africa, what the variables are concerned here, and if they take a genuine and sincere interest in what we are doing in South Africa, what we have done, and what we are doing in South Africa, then we will look for ways and means to assist them to undertake the activity in South Africa.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, I am glad that you are not a male chauvenist. I believe--I have not seen the copy myself--but I believe there has been a statement coming out of the conference to the effect that they would be working towards promoting dialogue in South Africa. Would you see that as being in line with the criteria mentioned by Mr Botha?

[Miller] Well, you know it is extremely difficult to visualize how a group such as that from outside South Africa's borders can actually facilitate dialogue which we cannot facilitate ourselves in South Africa. But let me say that I think one of the major aspects of such a visit would be that it would facilitate an understanding by these countries of South Africa's situation, and in that respect I believe it would have a positive effect provided of course this group genuinely want to come here and see what the facts are for themselves.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, would it not be an unfortunate fact that the government found it difficult to get credible black leaders to negotiate with them?

[Miller] No. We are negotiating continuously. It depends who you identify as a credible leader. Let me say there are many black leaders in South Africa, and we are negotiating with a large number of those. But I think we have certain high-profile people in South Africa who are not necessarily elected political leader who at this stage do not want to come to the negotiating table. But as a general statement it is not correct to say that the government has not been able to negotiate with credible leaders in South Africa.

[Rogers] But is there no, perhaps, positive role which you see that these wise men or wise people could play, for instance in helping get around the same table government leaders and some of those you mention who have not been prepared to do so?

[Miller] Well I would say that is a remote possibility. One cannot exclude it entirely. But, you know, if you look at the reasons why certain leaders have not come to the negotiating table, then it is difficult to see how they could actually influence them to come to South Africa. You take for instance the leaders who support violence. It is not possible for the South African Government to meet with leaders that advocate violence for the overthrow of the South African Government. So unless those leaders themselves are prepared to fore swear violence, I cannot see how that group from outside can actually assist us here unless of course they are able to persuade those black leaders who advocate violence to stand aside from violence as a mechanism for bringing about change in South Africa. But of course they do not have to come to South Africa to do that.

[Rogers] Right. Foreign Minister Mr Botha has said that his government would seek ways and means of satisfying them in their mission. Now he did not say outright and categorically that everybody would in fact be allowed into this country. Would that be the case. Would they be allowed into the country?

[Miller] Well, the government has not expressed an opinion on this yet, and I think we can expect once the conference is finished to achieve clarity on these sort of issues.

[Rogers] You are being fairly careful about that as Mr Botha was, so we can read into that at least that it is by no means certain that the delegation or all of them will be allowed into South Africa.

[Miller] Well I think the question of who is going to be allowed in is actually a question of the cart and the horse story here. We would like to see what their intentions are first. We can get past that hurdle, and then possibly we can look at the question of who would be welcome in South Africa and who would not. I think it is academic at this stage until we know what the result is of the intentions of the conference being held in London today.

[Rogers] Would you not have already given this matter a great deal of thought in fact have come to a conclusion on it?

[Miller] It is possible that the cabinet are giving this thought, but I am not aware of any conclusion that they have come to at this stage.

[Rogers] Now, is there any other way if they do not come of satisfying their requirements. Are you not perhaps in a no-win situation where if you do not let them in, you are going to be criticized by the world, and if you do let them in, they are going to come up very probably with findings which again will condemn you?

[Miller] That is a very strong possibility, and that is why we would, as a South African Government, like to do everything positive and possible to assist them. But, of course, an a priori proviso to that is that they must be sincere about coming to South Africa to establish the facts for themselves, not just but to become another political international drum beating crowd who come here to make difficulties for South Africa in order to try and enhance their own stature.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, just briefly, how much muscle have they got?

[Miller] Well, you know the fact that they represent their governments to me indicates that they have a very considerable amount of clout. Also one should bear in mind that they represent the heads of Commonwealth meeting which was held in the Bahamas.

[Rogers] Mr Miller, thank you.

[Miller] Pleasure.

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CSO: 3400/646

SOUTH AFRICA

DUTCH CLAIM ARMS SMUGGLED TO DURBAN

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 4 Dec 85 p 3

[Text]

THE HAGUE — Dutch and Belgian police raided four businesses this week in a search for evidence of illegal arms smuggling to South Africa.

On Monday police impounded several of the administration documents of Alnautic, a company near Rotterdam.

A spokesman for the Rotterdam Public Prosecutor said yesterday the Dutch authorities were convinced arms were being smuggled to South Africa from West European ports despite the UN arms embargo.

In one case, it is alleged, a Dutch coaster changed its name three times while sailing to

Durban to disguise the fact it was delivering a consignment of arms to Durban.

The Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* said the Malta-registered 499-ton coaster Opper, owned by Alnautic, which carried a Dutch crew, changed its name several times during a voyage from Zeebrugge in Belgium to Durban in July this year.

The Opper, said the newspaper, had export documents which gave Indonesia as the final destination, but the cargo went to Durban.

Only a day before the coaster arrived in Durban, the name was changed on her hull and the ship's log was "corrected" by her captain to wipe out incriminating evidence, the report said.

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CSO: 3400/361

SOUTH AFRICA

SADF ADOPTS NEW POLICY TOWARD DRUG ABUSE IN FORCES

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 10 Dec 85 p 9

[Discussion by Colonel Joy Roux, Director of Social Work Services in the South African Medical Services, and others, reported by Janine Simon]

[Text]

"When an estimated 10 percent of the 15 to 25-year-old sector of the national population use drugs in some form, it is unrealistic to expect the SADF — with a cross-section intake of national servicemen aged between 17 and 25 — not to reflect a drug problem," says Colonel Roux.

These drug users range from the experimenter to those who are addicted and in need of long-term rehabilitation.

Most serious drug problems, developing from factors like peer group pressure, escapism, or simply for "kicks", exist before a young man begins his national service.

Almost all of these are identified through questionnaires on intake, or through poor performance in the first weeks of basic training. These men sometimes stick out like a sore thumb, says Colonel Roux.

"But there are also factors in the army which, added to the fact that many young men are interested in self-exploration and experimenting, may worsen an existing dependence or lead to someone starting to use drugs.

Army discipline

"Tension and stress are evident from the time the national serviceman reports for service and has to adjust to army discipline and lifestyle and the physical and mental demands of basic training.

"He may be stationed in an isolated area or far from his home town, family and friends, or he may worry about letting down his squad — which add to feelings of isolation and loneliness."

The SADF aims to train healthy young men to defend the country, she says, it cannot afford to write off potential servicemen because they have a problem.

"We give them a chance," says Colonel Roux.

The SADF's latest written policy on drugs, formulated in 1983, is structured for more competent identification of the varying degrees of the problem and suitable treatment.

It also provides prevention programmes aimed at the specific problems of a unit, as isolation may mean that the percentage of users varies from unit to unit.

As drug use conflicts with the military ethos and things such as training schedules, it would be easy to imagine that serious users could be hounded if they admitted their problem.

Not so. "The answers to our initial confidential questionnaires are surprisingly honest and we guarantee that all dealings with the welfare worker are strictly confidential," says Colonel Roux.

This seems to be borne out by the men in the "Pathways" group at Voortrekkerhoogte — one of the new therapy groups aiming to help

the national serviceman overcome personal problems and achieve his own potential.

Duty exemption

All of the eight national servicemen spoken to agreed that their sessions remained completely confidential.

The wellbeing of the national servicemen at any unit is handled or referred for treatment by a professional welfare committee of the unit — also trained specifically in the identification, treatment and after-care of a drug user.

Perhaps the biggest step taken by the SADF in its new policy on drug users is the decision to allow serious users who are committed to rehabilitation to be exempted for six months and sent to a rehabilitation centre of their own choice, instead of having to go to the State institution.

The SADF also aims to treat the experimenters in its ranks with well-structured prevention programmes. But drug availability is a problem.

"When there is a demand, there is a supply and a well-orchestrated network to fulfil it.

"The military police and the SADF do their best, but it is not a prison and we cannot stop all contact with the world — servicemen get weekend passes and have visitors," says Colonel Roux.

SOUTH AFRICA

PAC'S ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY DISCUSSES ROLE IN FUTURE

Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 23 Nov 85 p 8

[Interview with Joe Mkwanazi, administrative secretary of PAC, date and place not given]

[Text]

Joe MKWANAZI, with the title of administrative secretary, is responsible for dealing with all the organisational problems of the PanAfricanist Congress of Azania. He is the PAC's second-ranking official after its new president, Johnson MLAMBO. While most of the leaders of the underground opposition in South Africa are Xhosa, Mr MKWANAZI is of Zulu origin. (Mr MLAMBO, who took over at the head of the PAC on the death last July of John NYATI POKELA, is from the small Tsonga ethnic group.) After a period of internal conflict culminating in the murder in obscure circumstances of David SIBEKO in 1979, the PAC now seems to have acquired a new unity which has enabled it to strengthen its organisation, improve its military preparedness with the aid of several friendly countries, including Yugoslavia and Libya, and also contain the African National Congress, which often tries to present itself as the only liberation movement in South Africa. The death of Mr POKELA now seems unlikely to have any repercussions on the overall leadership of the PAC, which did not change immediately afterwards.

Apart from training an increasing number of young recruits for the armed struggle, the PAC is currently busy making itself better known in Europe and Asia, hence the recent visit to China of Johnson MLAMBO. Its principal support at the present time comes from Yugoslavia, India, China and several African countries (Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Tanzania and Libya). It is ignored by the East European countries, which reserve their assistance for the ANC. When they comment on the lack of attention given to their activities by the foreign press, the PAC leaders often remark that the same was true of Robert MUGABE's ZANU movement during the war for Zimbabwean independence. While Joshua NKOMO's ZAPU received all the publicity, ZANU was in a majority in the field, they note. Perhaps significantly, the PAC's headquarters is located in the former ZANU base in Dar es Salaam.

I.O.N.- Have your relations with the ANC improved, or are they deteriorating?

JOE MKWANAZI: I think they are static. For example, we have read in the press that at their meeting (in Zambia) the ANC decided that they should and would work closely with the PAC. But this has not been conveyed officially to us. However we have met ANC officials and they have repeated that the ANC had made this decision. There may not be much change, but there will not be hostility.

I.O.N.- If the ANC starts negotiations with the South African government, how will you react? Do you think you will be consulted?

J.M.- Our reaction will depend on what form the negotiations take. We believe that there are already contacts between the government and the ANC. All government statements that it will never talk to the ANC is for public consumption. They have sent their men, for example Professor van der MERWE. If it is just negotiating reforms, the PAC will not do it. If it is to discuss majority rule based on one man, one vote, we will go.

I.O.N.- The present riots in South Africa are generally considered abroad to be spontaneous. What is your real influence on the course of events?

J.M.- The riots can not be spontaneous. That is a wrong conclusion. In 1976 it was said that the riots were spontaneous, but Zephania L. MOTHOPENG, a leader of the PAC, was condemned to 30 years in prison for having organised them, and also some members of the Black Consciousness Movement. We have some influence on what is happening now inside the country, though the media deliberately ignore the involvement of the PAC. The South African media have precise instructions from the government not to report anything without checking with the minister of law and order. The racist regime believes that the PAC is the most dangerous of organisations, and when they deal with the PAC they deal ruthlessly. The banning of various organisations in 1960 was a result of the activities of the PAC. The first trial held in complete secrecy outside the major cities was a PAC trial. Since 1963, 124 activists have been killed in jail or by police. Nobody talks about this; there is a conspiracy of silence. The people who initiated the rally last year in Uitenhage, in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville, were from the PAC. The Rand Daily Mail reported that the policeman who gave the order to fire told the commission of inquiry a "terrorist organisation" was involved. As far as our influence is concerned, the majority of the African people, and other minorities, are fighting for self-determination and the return of their land, and not only against apartheid. This is the most popular view and this is the view of the PAC.

I.O.N.- In Europe many people predict that once a black government takes over in South Africa there will be internal fighting amongst blacks. What is your own opinion?

J.M.- I do not think there will be much internal fighting. There may be some disagreements and skirmishes; we have a population of 28 million belonging to different tribes. The tribal question is only propped up by the racist regime. The tribal issue died in our country before 1912 (date of the founding of the ANC, of which the PAC is a breakaway movement).

I.O.N.- What about Gatscha BUTHELEZI?

J.M.- He exists as a tribal chief like many others. Even he himself, when he comes to the platform, normally claims he is not the leader of the Zulus only. He cannot stand and say he is the leader of the Zulus and against the other nationalists, or he would fall the next day. While the regime portrays him as a Zulu leader, or Matanzima as a Xhosa leader, they cannot stand on an open platform and say that. Our enemies will try to use tribal feelings, but I do not think they have a chance because in all these riots the actions of the people are not based on tribal lines.

I.O.N.- Most Western governments have understood that South Africa needs radical change, but at the same time they do not see the moderate leader they would like emerging from amongst the black. What is your opinion?

J.M.- Our country is so big, with a big population which has a mature political understanding. There is more than one tendency, and it is a mistake to look for one leader. Most of the real leaders who articulate and expose the aspirations of the people are either dead, like Mangaliso SOBUKWE (founder of the PAC) or in jail. Other countries have tried to put forward religious leaders or chiefs, whom they think they can control. Unfortunately for Western governments, if someone they consider a moderate leader is not able to articulate or represent the people's aspirations, he cannot be their leader.

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SOUTH AFRICA

NOVEMBER INFLATION RATE REACHES RECORD HIGH

MB190930 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0926 GMT 19 Dec 85

[Text] Pretoria, 19 Dec (SAPA)—South Africa's inflation rate rose to 16.9 percent in November, 0.1 percent above the previous all-time high reached a month earlier, according to government figures released in Pretoria today.

The inflation rate as measured by the Consumer Price Index [CPI] has reached three record-breaking levels during the year. In September it rose to 16.6 percent and in October to 16.8 percent.

A statement released by Central Statistical Services [CSS] said the increase in the price of food and transport contributed largely to the increase in the CPI for November.

In November last year, the inflation rate stood at 13.3 percent, the highest level measured during 1984.

The CPI for all income groups in November stood at 203.4 (base 1980 : 100), the CSS said, compared with 200.8 the previous month and 174 a year ago.

The index for food reached 198.8, up from 195.1 in October and 175.3 in November last year, while the commodities index rose to 198, compared with 194.9 in October and 167.9 last November.

The year-on-year inflation rates by income group for November are:

--Lower income group: inflation rate of 14.4 percent. (CPI: November 197.3, October 194.8, November, 1984, 172.5)

--Middle income group: 17 percent. (CPI: November 204.8, October 202.2, November, 175.1)

--Higher income group: 17.7 percent. (CPI: November 204.4, October 201.7, November, 1984, 173.7).

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10 January 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

INDUSTRY NEEDS NEW SOURCES OF ENERGY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Dec 85 p 24

[Text]

It was essential that industry assisted in finding alternative sources of energy as even with the Mossel Bay scheme South Africa would not be 100 percent self-sufficient in energy, Scope Industrial Holdings' chairman Cor Groot said in Johannesburg.

Mr Groot, whose group was among the 100 companies which recently received the International Trophy for Technology in Frankfurt, said Scope was looking at a number of alternative sources of energy such as wind power, recycling of energy and solar energy.

"We have come to a franchise agreement with a German manufacturer of wind turbines which we will be producing for the local market and eventually export market in Africa."

Mr Groot said his group's three principals in Europe would become heavily involved in the Mossel Bay scheme which was seen as the biggest project of its kind in the world at the moment.

Scope intended to expand its export markets which should account for about 25 percent of turnover in two years' time, Mr Groot said.

At the Hanover Fair this year, the group clinched an export deal for sheetmetal working machinery from both European and American clients.

"Because of its vastness we will increase our penetration of the American market where new business generated could amount to several million rand," Mr Groot said.

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SOUTH AFRICA

MINE INJECTS NEW LIFE INTO SISHEN-SALDANHA LINE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Dec 85 p 10

[Text] Cape Town--Shipment from Saldanha Bay yesterday of the one-millionth ton of metal-concentrate from the Black Mountain Mine at Aggeneys has highlighted an upsurge of activity on the controversial Sishen-Saldanha railway line.

The poor performance of the rand against other currencies is having the reverse-benefit effect of injecting new life into this "white elephant" line, which has incurred huge losses in the 10 years of its existence.

The one-millionth ton of metal-concentrate forms part of a 13 689 ton consignment from Aggeneys, in the North-West Cape, loaded into the Greek bulk-carrier Geoge, which had sailed for Antwerp yesterday.

The shipment is the 111th since production started at the Black Mountain Mine six years ago.

Most of the mine's products have been exported to Europe and Japan.

The Black Mountain Development Company is a lead, zinc, copper and silver-mining joint venture by Goldfields of SA and Phelps Dodge Corporation of the US.

At a gathering at Saldanha Bay on Monday it had been stated Black Mountain had reduced its debts from R111,5-million in December 1979 to R40-million in September this year.

At the end of last year the company showed a net profit of R22,7-million.

A "very optimistic" Mr Neels Hubinger, area manager of South African Transport Services for the North-West Cape, said the carriage of ores including concentrates from Aggeneys, on the 861 km Sishen-Saldanha line, had recently been increased to 60 percent of the line's full capacity--18 million tons a year.

Mr Hubinger said three 120-truck ore trains a day have been using the line and 10,5-million tons would be moved in the 1985/6 financial year.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

INDUSTRY PERFORMS BETTER--Cape Town--The Stellenbosch Bureau for Economic Research says a survey of industrialists has shown that the recession may have bottomed-out and businessmen are becoming more optimistic although the prevailing attitude is still pessimistic. The survey of more than 1 300 factories was for the last quarter of this year and the first of 1986. It found that industry had performed better across the board than had been predicted in a previous survey and the future was less sombre. Far fewer industrialists reported drops in sales and more reported higher capacity utilisation. There was also higher employment. However many more industrialists also reported higher costs, particularly of labour and materials. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Dec 85 p 24] /13046

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